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ABSTRACT
The evolution of public policy on a major California water project,
from 1956 to the present, is analyzed. This project, a concrete
ditch called the Valley Drain, was designed to remove waste water
from farms in the San Joaquin Valley. The effluent was to be
discharged into the San Joaquin-Sacramento River Delta, outside of
San Francisco Bay. In implementing out their plans, the proponents
of the drain (the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and the California
Department of Water Resources) faced a difficult political battle,
and the drain was only one-third completed.
The analysis scrutinzes the roles of several actors and issues
in the drain controversy. Among these actors are water-supply
agencies, farmers' organizations, and environmental groups. Three
issues in the conflict which were important to the formulation
and development of public policy are emphasized. These are, the
difficulty of finding workable finance mechanisms, the use of
scientific evidence in a politicized setting, and the search for
alternatives to the drain.
As a tool for interpreting the evolution of policy in the case of
the drain, the thesis relies on a theoretical framework developed
by Paul Sabatier (1985). A main feature of the framework is its
elucidation of the importance of "policy learning" as a result of
the interaction of advocacy coalitions, deeply-held beliefs about
a problem area, and a shifting political environment. The thesis
concludes that Sabatier's framework is a generally useful
explanatory device, but that the nuances of experience in the
drain conflict suggest some revision.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Martin Rein
Title: Professor of Sociology
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This thesis is built around two major queries. The first is,
what drives the evolution of public policy over long periods of
time? The second question reflects one aspect of the first; what
makes organizations politically effective? Specifically, I want
to understand how advocacy groups define and achieve (or alter)
their goals, and how this affects the overall evolution of
policy, especially in shifting, complicated environments.
In this thesis, the answers to my questions are based on an
analysis of the policy evolution of a deeply controversial
California agricultural water project. The project, the San
Joaquin Valley Drain, was proposed thirty years ago by the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and the California Department of
Water Resources (DWR), and is currently one of the most divisive
water quality and agricultural issues in the state. Very briefly,
the drain was designed to remove a type of waste water produced
on farms in California's enormously productive central valley.
The waste water was to be discharged 50 to 290 miles away, at the
confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers, which empty
into San Francisco Bay.
By 1990, it it likely that well over $100 million will have
been spent on the drain, for planning, environmental studies and
construction (work on the drain stoppped when it was one-third
finished; about $40 million was spent before 1975). Despite all
this expenditure, however, resolution of the conflict remains
elusive.
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The arguments against the drain center on cost and
environmental effects. However, without some way of removing the
waste water, large amounts of farmland may be forced out of
production.
In 1984, the confirmation that the slowly accumulating
drainage water was more toxic than anyone had previously known
shook the framework of the entire debate. The finding that flows
from the drain were poisoning much of the fauna at Kesterson
Reservior, a valley wildlife refuge, removed the the possibility
that the drain would be built to the river delta. The discovery
set all the major parties scrambling for alternative solutions to
the problem, in the process calling into question fundamental
assumptions about water supply and farming in the valley.
A. Achieving Effectiveness
Beyond the standard political tools of money and access to
the power and media, I am interested in three closely-related
factors which I hypothesize will help interest groups to be
effective. The first, and most encompassing, of these is the
ability to undergo policy learning, eg., to adapt within a
changing environment, develop effective new strategies, and avoid
repeating old mistakes. The second reflects an aspect of the
first, and is the ability to prevail in important negotiations,
to analyze their dynamics, and especially, to engage in
integrative bargaining (ie., overcome stalemates and solve
problems by jointly developing innovative solutions). Third, also
related to policy learning, I think groups will be successful if
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they understand the role of technical and scientific evidence in
public disputes, and pick the technical analyses they promote in
their arguments carefully.
In the case of the San Luis Drain, there are many examples
of effective and ineffective pursuit of strategies in these three
categories. To reduce the analysis to a manageable size, I will
assess the actions of three pairs of organizations which have
been especially influential in shaping public policy.
1. The water-supply agencies
The first pair includes the agencies which proposed the
project, USBR and DWR. The Bureau of Reclamation is a powerful
force in the development of major dams and irrigation projects in
the West, and has been incredibly tenacious in its pursuit of the
drain. However, the Bureau has not been successful in getting the
drain built, and has not been especially innovative in pursuing
strategies which would better achieve its purpose. Recently, the
actions of the Bureau, and its parent agency, the Department of
Interior, have been especially damaging to the agency's public
credibility.
I will argue that the source of the Bureau's tenacity and
its ineffectiveness are the same: an entrenched ideological and
bureaucratic committment to a fixed pattern of operation. In the
past, the Bureau has been extremely effective as a construction
and engineering-oriented institution. However, the political and
natural environment in which the Bureau functions has undergone
major changes. Politically, many more actors are involved in
setting policy on the projects the Bureau promotes and maintains,
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and their interests less often align with the Bureau's. In the
natural environment, the costs of USBR activity are increasing.
The good dam sites in the West have been taken, and competition
for water is increasing. The severity and complexity of
environmental problems associated with the Valley Drain are
beyond anything the Bureau would have forseen even ten years ago.
The Bureau of Reclamation is not especially good at joint
problem solving, and does not easily learn from its mistakes. In
some ways, the Bureau has been fairly crafty in its use of
scientific arguments, but also has alienated the much of the
scientific community involved in research on the drain and
related environmental problems. The Bureau has a tendency to use
scientific research to build its public credibility, which has
not been healthy for either the quality of its research or public
perceptions.
The second of the water agencies, the Department of Water
Resources, has been generally as influential as USBR in
California water development, with some subtle but important
differences. However, DWR has not been as committed to the drain,
and has been more flexible in its search for alternatives. DWR
has also been less willing to provide subsidized, ultra-cheap
water to farmers than the Bureau. This difference will become
increasingly important as the politics of California water
allocation shift from a north/south confrontation to an
urban/rural clash (despite the fact that California has a
population of 22 million, agriculture accounts for 85 percent of
water use in the state).
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If it had been given the opportunity, DWR may have pursued
the drain as vigorously as the Bureau, but has faced greater
constraints on its resources than the federal agency. DWR has
also been subjected to greater internal and external pressures
for change. Many of these have to do with shifts in state
administration and battles over other water supply projects, like
the Peripheral Canal.
2. The environmental interest groups
The strategies of the two environmental groups I am
analyzing belong to the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). Both of these groups
were created in the early seventies, and their general approach
to California water issues was shaped by the same individuals.
However, EDF has been involved in the drain case much longer than
NRDC.
In its opposition to the drain, EDF has conciously sought,
analyzed, and fought for alternatives to the project which will
help solve the wastewater problem faced by farmers. Because of
the discovery of wastewater toxcicity, EDF is now in a position
to capitalize on its long investment in research and analysis. In
an unusual but positive turn in the controversy, EDF and the
Westlands Water District (which serves farmers in the valley),
may soon pursue cooperative research on solutions to the
wastewater problem. The research is based on EDF's ideas, a
federal loan, and Westlands' land and common interest.
It is unlikely that NRDC will find itself in a similarly
cooperative position vis-a-vis agricultural interests. NRDC's
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main activity in the drain conflict has been to file and
coordinate lawsuits against government agencies, to force action
on the Kesterson problem. This has hardened NRDC's positions in
the type of informal negotiations which led to the EDF/Westlands
agreement, but has also increased its visibility in the press and
served an important purpose in environmental groups' approach to
the drain.
Both EDF and NRDC are on the forefront of an evolving
economic critique of government agricultural water policy in
California, which most likely will become an important component
of future policy debates. From the standpoint of the entire
environmental/water reform movement, the division of labor
between the two advocacy groups (EDF offering the carrot, NRDC
weilding the stick) is a flexible, well-designed strategy.
3. The growers' organizations
Farmers throughout the valley have taken varying positions
of support or neutrality on the Valley Drain, and these have
fluctuated over time. Two growers' organizations have played
especially important roles, the Westlands Water District, and the
Community Alliance for a Responsible Water Policy.
The Westlands Water District is a public agency which
receives about 1,150,000 acre-feet (af.) of irrigation water
annually from USBR (Westlands is officially a political
jurisdiction of the state). Westlands acts as a kind of water
wholesaler and distributor to about 290 users in the district,
who farm approximately 568,000 acres. Westlands also represents
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the political and legal interests of the growers it serves, who
farm large acreages and are generally very wealthy. The Westlands
Water District is an important institution in state politics,
and is well-financed and well-connected. It hires the best
lawyers and lobbyists and its staff are top experts in their
fields.
Westlands' political strategies usually involve using the
lobbying and legal power of the district before trying other
approaches. However, though Westlands is a politically
conservative institution, it is also very flexible in doing what
is necessary to meet the needs its growers.
Measured in terms of gross receipts, the Westlands farmlands
are among the richest in the world. The District has been very
effective at protecting and enhancing its interests, which
include federally-subsidized water supplies and limited
enforcement of acreage limitation laws for lands receiving
subsidized water. As demonstrated in the case of the Valley
Drain, the Westlands WD has a high capacity for policy learning,
is effective in many types of negotiations, and at least compared
to USBR, does not overextend the political use of technical
arguments. These attributes are both precursors and products of
the numerous resources which the district commands.
The Community Alliance for a Responsible Water Policy is a
grassroots organization of growers who own farms on a 42,000 acre
section of the territory covered by the Westlands WD. Since 1984,
the farmers who started the Community Alliance have been
especially hard hit by the soil drainage problems the Valley
Drain was originally intended to solve. The Department of
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Interior has threatened to shut off their irrigation water
supplies, and the on-farm pipe systems which convey waste water
to the drain are currently being plugged by the Westlands WD. The
implications of these actions are that farmers of the Community
Alliance are may have to abandon their lands within the next few
years.
The Community Alliance has only been organized for two
years, and does not have resources comparable to Westlands. The
Alliance has been able to garner a good deal of sympathetic press
coverage, and their predicament carries a lot of symbolic weight.
The strategies of the Community Alliance, which include lawsuits,
legislative lobbying, attempts to join important negotiations,
and high-visibility public protests, are good choices for a bad
situation, but may not salvage farmers' interests in the long
run.
If their position worsens, there are in theory ways that the
farmers could recapture the value of their lost farms (eg., sell
their water entitlements to Los Angeles, for a large profit).
Whether these strategies are reasonable for a group of farmers to
consider remains to be seen.
B. An Overview of the Thesis
Chapters 2-5 describe the Valley Drain and the background
and evolution of the conflict over its implementation. In keeping
with the themes of the thesis, the focus is on analysis and
description of institutional activities and potential areas of
policy learning. The increasing level of scientific understanding
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about the drain's environmental impacts and the growing numbers
of actors in the dispute are also highlighted. The appendices
contain greater detail on technical i-ssues and political
participation.
The roles and strategies of the actors described above are
analyzed in the remaining chapters. Three issues which cut across
the activities of all the parties are emphasized; the problem of
financing the drain, the role of scientific evidence, and the
search for alternative solutions.
The concluding chapters view these facets of the dispute in
terms of a highly developed theoretical framework, constructed by
Sabatier (1985), which links policy learning and evolution. The
framework also focuses on the role of values and beliefs of
important players as a driving force in their interaction.
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C. List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
ABAG Association of Bay Area Governments
af. acre-feet
BCDC S. F. Bay Conservation and Development Commission
CCCWA Contra Costa County Water Agency
CDFG California Department of Fish and Game
CDF California Department of Food and Agriculture
CVP Central Valley Project
DOI U.S. Department of the Interior
DWR California Department of Water Resources
EDF Environmental Defense Fund
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
MWD L.A. Metropolitan Water District
NPDES National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
NRDC Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
RWQCB Regional Water Quality Control Board
ppb parts per billion
ppm parts per million
SWP State Water Project
SWRCB California State Water Resources Control Board
TDS total dissolved solids
USBR U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
USGS U.S. Geological Survey
WD Water District
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CHAPTER 2.
AGRICULTURE, WATER, AND SOIL SALINIZATION IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY
A. The Role of Government Water Projects In California
Agriculture
The conflict over the Valley Drain takes place against the
backdrop of California's enormously successful agricultural
industry, which produced $13 billion in gross receipts in 1981,
more than any other state. Irrigation is a critical part of this
picture--10 million acres of land in the state are irrigated. The
most productive of these include 4.5 million acre9 in the San
Joaquin Valley, in the central part of the state, roughly between
Sacramento and Bakersfield (Goodenough, 1985).
The success of San Joaquin Valley agriculture depends on
several factors: a long growing season, cheap migrant labor,
available transportation to eastern markets, advanced
mechanization, the use of fertilizer and pesticides, and the
high mineral content of the soils (the valley is very arid, so
rains have not leached minerals out of the earth). Most
importantly, San Joaquin Valley farming is the result of the
import of vast amounts of irrigation water into what used to be a
desert.
Though California water delivery and allocation is very
complicated, the basic facts of water use in the state are fairly
simple. Most of the rain and snowfall in California is in the
north, in the Sierra and Trinity Mountains. Most of the farmland
is in the central part of the state, and most of the population
is in the south. To collect water where it falls and deliver it
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to where it is used, government agencies have built a network of
over 140 reserviors and 2000 miles of canals (Goodenough, .1985).
The design and construction of these facilities is the
province of three large government agencies, the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the state
Department of Water Resources. Of all the activities of these
agencies, two projects, the largest of their kind in the world,
stand out.
The first is the Central Valley Project (CVP), built by the
Bureau of Reclamation in the 1960s and '70s, and paid for by the
state and federal governments (Figure 1). The second is the State
Water Project, conceived by the Department of Water Resources;
Figure 2.
Both of these projects trap spring runoff behind dams in
northern California, and over the year regulate its release into
the Sacramento River. Flowing from the north and south, the
Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers meet in an extensive delta,
outside San Francisco Bay. At the southern end of the delta,
giant pumps lift water into a set of canals and reserviors,
initiating the transfer from north to south. This water flows to
the federal San Luis Unit, 600,000 acres of farmland on the west
side of the San Joaquin Valley, which contains the Westlands
Water District. Beyond the San Luis Unit, DWR's California
Aqueduct carries water to farms in Kern County, in the southern
part of the valley. At the bottom of the valley, 300,000-
horespower pumps push the water over the Tehachapi Mountains, to
Los Angeles and the Metropolitan Water District.
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Figure 2. The State Water Project
source: DWR
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Two final aspects of the CVP and SWP are important to the
drain controversy. The first is the impacts of the projects on
the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta, a resource of much
importance to the cities of the Bay Area. The Delta provides
drinking and industrial water for Contra Costa County, which
faces the eastern edge of the bay. It also supports wildlife, an
important sport fishery and other recreational uses, as well as
500,000 acres of farms which have been devleoped behind levees in
the Delta's rich bottom land.
Because the water projects take so much water out of the
Delta that would normally flow to San Francisco Bay, sea water
from the bay frequently intrudes up Delta channels, threatening
the positive uses of the area. The debate over USBR and DWR's
obligations to protect the Delta from saline intrusion, and to
guarantee that outflows are great enough to maintain beneficial
uses is one of the most contentious issue in California water
policy. Delta water planning has been the subject of two
statewide referenda, and interminable study and argument (Jackson
and Paterson, 1977). A key player in this policy area is the
State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB), which sets
environmental standards and all-ocation rules for water use,
focusing on the Delta especially.
The second aspect of the water projects which surfaces in
the analysis of the drain is the way in which they have been
financed and repaid. This is especially important for the CVP,
which was financed by bonds with a 50-year repayment period.
Because of the way USBR has interpreted the repayment
requirements for the CVP, farmers receive water at an extreme
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rate of subsidy, estimated by USBR critics at 90 percent of total
water costs (the average price for water supplied by the CVP is
$6.15 per acre-foot (af.); the cost of providing the water is
estimated at $66.82 per af.; LeVeen and King, NRDC, 1985).
B. The Hydrology of Soil Salinization
Beneath the gently sloping alluvial soils of the San Joaquin
Valley's western side lies an impermeable layer of clay, which
runs in a 300-mile crescent between Tracy and Bakersfield. In
parts of the valley, this clay layer sits between five and twenty
feet below the soil surface (see Figure 3). The clay prevents
irrigation water from draining through the soil deep into the
valley's main aquifer or the San Joaquin River. Instead, the
water slowly accumulates beneath farmland, resulting in a
"perched" water table close to the soil's surface.
As subsurface water levels slowly rises, the action of
plants and evaporation deposits layers of salt near the surface
of the soil. As salt builds up in the root zone, it inhibits the
ability of plants to absorb moisture and oxygen, stunting growth
or killing plants entirely (Figure 4). This phenemenon, soil
salinization, has been a major problem in the history of
agricultural civilisations. Soil salinization was noticed in
Mesopotamia around 2400 B.C., and is thought to have been a
primary cause of the decline of the Sumerian Empire and the
desertification of the Egyptian Nile Valley (IDP, 1979b:3-1 to 3-
6, 6-1).
C. Soil Salinization Impacts and Responses
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Figure 3. Drainage Problem Areas
source: IDP, 1979
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Figure 4. Salinization in a Sugar Beet Field
source: California Agriculture, October, 1984
photo by W.E. Wildman
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In response to salinization and soil drainage problems,
California farmers and water supply agencies have installed tile
drains, rows of perforated pipe set about eight feet below the
soil surface at 250-300 foot intervals. Tile drains are designed
to remove irrigation runoff from beneath farmland and deliver it
to a network of collector pipes. The collector network would in
turn discharge to a proposed Valley Drain running north to the
San Joaquin-Sacramento River Delta (Figure 5; IDP, 1979b:3-3, 3-
4). The implementation of this proposed drain is the focus of
this paper.
Estimates of the potential damages of soil salinization have
been a major part of the justification for the drain, and have
varied over time. A major assessment of current and future
problems was conducted between 1975 and 1979 by the San Joaquin
Valley Interagency Drainage Program (IDP), which was sponsored by
USBR, DWR, and the SWRCB. The IDP's projection of drainage
problem areas is shown in Table 1
The IDP's estimate of net farm benefits associated with its
Valley Drain proposal was set at an annual equivalent value of
$40,680,000, a figure calculated for a 100-year time span at a 6
7/8ths percent discount rate. (IPD, 1979:E-2). An estimate of
current crop production losses not diffracted by the IDP's net-
present-value calculation is $32 million per year, which might
increase to $321 million per year by 2000 (Beck, 1979).
15
Figure 5. Proposed Drain Outfall in the Western Delta
source: USBR, 1984
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Table 1. IDP Projections of Drainage Problem Areas and Drain
Water Quantities, 1985-2085 (IDP, 1979b:6-4).
Maximum Area
Requiring
Drai nage (acres)
294,000
462,000
586,000
693,000
792,000
867,000
925,000
1,040,000
Area Actually
Drained
(acres)
56,000
346,000
507,000
623,000
720,000
807,000
876,000
1,023,000
Quantities of
Drainage Effluent
(acre-feet)*
57,000
310,000
424,000
484,000
518,000
566,000
575,000
668,000
*from "Area Actually Drained"
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1985
1995
2005
2015
2025
2035
2045
2085
Agriculture is estimated to provide 27.4 percent of the
valley's employment, and supports a total business acivity of
over $30 billion (Beck, 1979). Hence, the indirect effects of
soil salinization are potentially substantial.
Seepage of subsurface irrigation waters that do not remain
in perched water tables generally causes damage in other
locations. Such seepage is blamed for nitrate contamination of
wells drawing from underground aquifers in Tulare and Kern
Counties, in the southern valley (Sac. Bee, 1980c; L.A. Times,
1979), and also contributes to salinity problems in the San
Joaquin River. Drainage flows contaminated with selenium are
currently poisoning wildlife in the valley, a problem discussed
in depth in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 3.
CONFLICT OVER THE DRAIN DURING THE WATER AGENCIES' PRIME, 1956-67
After salinity problems in the valley increased in the
1950s, both DWR and USBR made proposals to construct a drain, and
detailed planning progressed through the early 1960s. By 1964,
opposition to the drain among Delta interests had coalesced,
focusing on the effects of drainage effluent on water quality in
the Delta and San Francisco Bay.
Conflicting technical opinions on the drain's impacts were
presented in state and federal legislative hearings in 1964 and
1965. However, in these years, environmental arguments couldn't
stop the drain; the concensus of these sessions was to proceed
with construction and further studies simultaneously. With plans
and funding for drain construction nearing final approval in late
1966, flaws in the financing mechanism for the drain emerged, and
the momentum of the project ebbed, preparing the stage for the
increasingly complicated conflicts and technical arguments which
have evolved to the present.
A. Assessing the Need for a Drain and Initiating Plans for
Construction, 1955-1964.
In various forms, problems with saline water have recurred
in the valley since dryland farming began in the 1890s (Kelley
and Nye, 1984). One of the first major indications that the big
water supply projects would create new problems with salinity
occured in the early 1950s, when farmers noticed that irrigation
water taken from the San Joaquin River was getting saltier. (When
18
crops are irrigated with relatively saline water, the total water
requirement is increased. This is due to the fact that as plant
roots extract water from the soils around them, salts precipitate
out. To keep these salts from eventually damaging the crop, more
water must be applied to flush them out of the root zone. This is
known as leaching; for a further discussion of leaching and water
conservation issues, see Chapter 7).
The salinity problems in the San Joaquin River were
investigated by DWR and west-side water companies and irrigation
districts. These studies determined that the source of this
salinity was the Mendota Pool, which collects comparatively
saline agricultural runoff from farms supplied by the Delta-
Mendota Canal (built by USBR in 1951) and releases it into the
river on a scheduled basis (Jackson and Patterson, 1977:136).
High water tables and drainage conditions themselves were
emphasized in hearings held by the California Legislature's Joint
Commission on Water Problems in 1956. Here, the argument for a
valley drain took what would soon become a familiar form.
According to the Committee, "[our] investigation shows the
immediate need for . . . the formulation of a comprehensive
master drainage works system if the valley's farm economy is to
be saved from general collapse" (DWR, 1967a:2)
1. USBR and DWR planning in the early 1960s
The late 1950s were also the years of conception for USBR's
San Luis Unit and DWR's State Water Project, both of which
anticipated the need for the drain. DWR's proposal for the
California Water Plan briefly described the purpose of a "San
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Joaquin waste conduit." Two months after the release of the of
the Water Plan, the California Legislature authorized the San
Joaquin Valley Drainage Investigation, to continue assessment and
planning for the drain (DWR, 1967a).
The San Luis Unit was proposed by the USBR in 1955, and four
years of Congressional authorization hearings began a year later.
During these, the Director of DWR testified in support of the
USBR, and when the San Luis Unit was authorized in 1960,
construction was made contingent on provision of a drain to the
Delta, either by the USBR or the state (DWR, 1974:3). In 1959,
the Burns-Porter Act was passed, authorizing funds for the State
Water Project, and also containing a provision for DWR to
construct drainage facilities.
In the valley, recognition of salinity problems increased,
as dry years between 1959 and 1961 pushed the salinity of the San
Joaquin River over two times earlier peak levels (DWR, 1956:5;
DWR, 1960:116). In 1963, Warren Schoonover, a salinity expert
working as a consultant for the USBR, quantified the additional
irrigation costs to farmers during these years as between $5.00
and $15.00 per acre, due to increased purchases of water for
leaching, pumping of moderately saline groundwater, and lab
testing for irrigation management (Schoonover, 1963).
Increasing the pressure on USBR to build a drain, in
December of 1962, a group of valley landowners and irrigation
district representatives filed suit against the Bureau, claiming
that irrigation provided without drainage would damage their
lands due to salt build-up. The USBR argued that it was still
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studying alternative drain routes and discharge points, and DWR
filed a friend-of-the-court brief in its favor. Federal Judge
M.D. Crocker ruled in favor of the USBR, but established that the
plaintiffs could renew their suit if the drain wasn't constructed
and their land was threatened (Calif. State Water Res. Comm.,
1966:17). The suit was renewed in 1967; USBR restated its intent
to build a drain, and the case was eventually dropped in 1973
(Jackson and Paterson, 1977).
In June of 1961, DWR informed USBR that its planning wasn't
advanced enough to guarantee a state drain from the federal
service area, and advised the USBR to go ahead with its own drain
(DWR, 1967a). In 1963, the USBR announced that construction of a
San Luis Interceptor Drain would begin in 1966 and be completed
by 1968 (Jackson and Paterson, 1977).
After two years of planning, DWR changed its position and
joined a drainage task force with USBR. In November of 1963, this
task force met with a "Delta Counties Consulting Board" in
Stockton, to state that because of timing requirements imposed on
the Bureau by the San Luis Unit Authorizing Act and Judge
Crocker, separate federal and state drains would be constructed.
As the nucleus of an emerging coalition against the drain,
government agencies and officials from the Delta and Bay Area
vigorously protested the proposals for dual drains (DWR, 1967a).
These plans and protests led the meetings in California and
Washington, D.C. in March of 1964, wich included Assistant
Secretary of the Interior Kenneth Holum, representatives of
California's two senators, congressmen from Contra Costa County
and the valley, and the Directors of DWR and USBR's Mid-Pacific
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Region. In Washington, it was agreed that the water agencies
would try to construct a single drain, and the first alternatives
to the drain were proposed. At Holum's request, USBR was
designated to prepare three plans for storing drainage effluent
in ponds and discharging it into the San Joaquin River during
peak flow periods. However, these plans were not warmly met by
USBR staff and valley interests, and were not seriously pursued
(California State Senate Water Resources Committee, 1966).
After a one-year delay to combine plans, in June of 1964,
DWR Director William Warne made a formal statement that a master
drain constructed by the state, with federal planning and
financial assistance, would meet the requirements of the San Luis
Unit (DWR, 1967a). The first stage of the drain, from Kettleman
City to the Delta, was scheduled for completion in 1970. In the
spring of 1965, the Bureau went to Congress to request
supplemental funds for construction The first draft of a joint-
use contract was completed soon afterward and finalized in
December (DWR, 1967a).
2. Concern over the drain's impacts and the emergence of
the Delta coalition
As the DWR-USBR task force presented its situation to
elected officials and agency staff from the Delta and Bay Area in
November of 1963, concern over the drain's impact on water
quality in the Delta and San Francisco Bay grew. Requests were
made that the terminus of the drain be placed as far west, toward
the bay, as possible, and consultants were hired to bring
technical evidence to the dispute.
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In June of 1963, the U.S. Public Health Service released a
minor investigation of Delta water quality issues pertaining to
California's agricultural water projects, which had been
requested by USBR a year earlier. The study didn't have a
prominent role in later debates, but presaged the fears of the
Delta coalition that siting a drain outfall in the Delta would
set a precedent for expansion of the drain southward into the
state service area. Important questions were also raised about
harms caused by pesticides carried in drainage effluent, impacts
on anadromous fish species, and biostimulation (growth of algae
caused by increased concentrations of nutrients, such as
fertilizer-derived nitrogen carried by the drain; U.S. Public
Health Service, 1963).
In April of 1964, the Contra Costa County Water Agency
(CCCWA), which takes its drinking water supply from the Delta,
issued its own "emergency report." This claimed that the fresh
waters of the Delta were "gravely threatened" by the drain
(Jackson and Paterson, 1977:140).
Held in the valley town of Los Banos and dominated by
legislators from the region, in October of 1964, the California
Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Water Resources convened an
acrimonious set of hearings on the drain. Supporters of the drain
argued "there is no alternative to draining the San Joaquin
Valley except its eventual ruin, and that a lot sooner than some
might think" (Calif. Senate Water Res. Comm, 1966:13).
Politicians from the Contra Costa County area,
representatives from the Association of Bay Area Governments
(ABAG), the CCCWA, and the San Francisco Regional Water Quality
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Control Board all came out to protest the drain. This group
pressed for a five-year delay in order to conduct a comprehensive
study of Bay Area water pollution, to which the drain was
considered a potential contributor. The CCCWA also presented a
report from the engineering firm Metcalf and Eddy, quantifying
large reductions in the value of Delta recreation and increased
costs for treatment of industrial water sources.
At this time, the primary environmental issue was the
salinity of the drainage flows. In defense of their proposal,
USBR and DWR claimed that after accumulated salts in the soil
were leached out, the salinity of drainage waters would only be
about 2,500 ppm TDS (parts per million of total dissolved solids.
As a response to all possible objections, the water agencies also
argued that the drain's staged construction schedule would allow
many opportunities for mitigating adverse impacts which might
arise. (Calif. Senate Water Res. Comm., 1966:13-16).
With Senator George Miller (of Contra Costa County)
dissenting, the committee concluded:
The evidence before this committee indicates that the
discharge of the proposed joint drain into the bay area will
probably, at the worst, be a relatively minor addition
to the bay area's pollution problem, and, at best, a
negligible one. Furthermore, the bay area is presently
receiving about two-thirds of the agricultural waste water
from the Central Valley, and the initial discharge of the
drain in quantity does not equal that of one oil refinery
in the Richmond District.
At the moment, no more than mere possibilities of
significant damage to the quality of the receiving waters
appear to exist, and even at full capacity 20 years hence
the discharge of the drain cannot be considered as a
probable cause of pollution in the bay area.
. D . in the committee's opinion, the wisest and soundest
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course for both state and federal governments would be to
press forward with all possible speed in the immediate
construction of the joint drain with appropriate safeguards
for the delta receiving waters and also with the immediate
initiation of comprehensive studies of the total bay-delta
pollution problem (Calif. Senate Water Res. Com., 1966:8-9).
By January of 1965, John Baldwin and other Bay Area
congressional representatives successfully took their attack on
the drain to the federal level, in the form of an amendment to
the annual USBR appropriations bill. The Baldwin Amendment
required that the drain not "be operated so as to discharge
waters which are harmful or deleterious" to the bay and Delta,
that impacts of the drainage effluent be monitored by the
Department of the Interior, HEW, and the state, and that the
Secretary of HEW retain the authority to halt harmful discharges
(Calif. Senate Water Res. Comm, 1966:59; Swain, 1983).
Because a similar bill had failed the year before,
supporters of the Baldwin Amendment also convinced President
Lyndon B. Johnson to cut drain construction funds from the
federal budget. In the process, $300,000 was allocated for
another study by the U.S. Public Health Service on drainage
effluent impacts (S. F. Chronicle, 1965b:14).
This study was delegated to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration (FWPCA). Following the "general agreement
that a drainage project will be required to permit the important
agricultural economy of the San Joaquin Valley to continue to
prosper," the FWPCA completed the research in one year, in order
to avoid "unnecessary project delay" (FWPCA, .1967:1).
The FWPCA report was supposed to address a broad spectrum of
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water quality issues and contingencies for the Delta over a 40
year period, and was completed in late 1966, recommending that
construction should proceed (FWPCA, 1967:16). The study concluded
that pollution control measures and nitrogen removal operations
would protect the Delta from harmful effluent impacts, and that
the drain would not increase pesticide concentrations in the
Delta, except in the case of Toxaphene, which was in declining
use in the valley (FWPCA, 1967:65-66).
During the same years, less important hearings on the drain
were held by the California Water Commission and the U.S. Senate
Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee. In both of these cases, the
final recommendation was to proceed with construction and impact
studies simultaneously. (Jackson and Paterson, 1977:142).
3. Finance and repayment as the critical barriers to
construction
By December of 1966, with planning coordinated, joint-use
contracts signed, and a major study in support of the drain's
safety, construction was imminent. In the first weeks of 1967,
however,'problems developed in DWR's plans for financing the
drain, and DWR was forced to withdraw from the project. As the
momentum which had brought the Valley Drain so close to
implementation slipped away, a new phase in the conflict emerged.
Problems in financing DWR's effort first arose in 1963, when
dual drains were being considered by USBR and DWR. USBR had the
authority to attach a $.50 per af. surcharge to its water
deliveries throughout the San Luis Unit service area in order to
assure partial repayment from beneficiaries of the drain, and
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eventually contracted with westside growers to do this (Calif.
Senate Water Res. Comm., 1965:73-74; 1966, 33-34). DWR lacked
this ability, and realized that a straight user fee levied solely
for disposal of drainage effluent would be too high for growers
to support. Instead, DWR proposed the creation of special tax
districts in the valley, justified by the indirect benefits which
valley communities receive from agriculture (DWR, 1967a:7).
However, bills introduced to meet this purpose in the state
legislature in 1961, 1963, and 1965 either died in committee or
were referred to study with no subsequent action (DWR, 1967).
To overcome these barriers, a two-stage financing plan was
proposed. The initial stage of drain construction would be 60
percent federally funded, deferring the need for special tax
districts. Of the remaining state share, 75 percent would be paid
by user fees, and 25 percent would be derived from state water
bonds (Gardner, 1966). Later extension of the drain southward,
further into the state service area, would require local taxation
and possibly "public education programs" to generate support
(Calif. Senate Water Res. Comm., 1966:33-34).
In the absence of a special tax district plan, in mid-1965,
DWR director Warne offered potential drainage contractors a
contract for full repayment of the costs of providing drainage
service ($15 to $18 per af.) This contract provided that
unanticipated future costs which might arise (such as treatment
plants) could be added to the basic user fee. Local irrigation
agencies rejected this contract unanimously (DWR, 1967a:8).
In response, USBR, DWR, and potential contractors negotiated
an interim contract, designed to initiate construction and
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recover part of the cost to the state, explicitly deferring the
need for special taxing districts. With user fees at $6.00 per
af. of effluent discharged into the drain, irrigation districts
were enthusiastic and supportive; these agencies signed contracts
reserving 110 percent of the available first-stage drainage
capacity by late 1966 (Warne, 1966a, DWR, 1967a).
In mid-December, 1966, the final draft of the USBR-DWR
contract was forwarded to Washington, to obtain the signature of
the Secretary of the Interior. Though "the agreement had been
approved by Secretary Udall and found satisfactory by the Bureau
of Reclamation," the contract was held at the Bureau of the
Budget, waiting for a clearance that supposedly could not be made
until President Johnson returned from Texas, after January 1,
1967 (Warne, 1966b).
On January 2, 1967, the administration of newly-elected
Governor Ronald Reagan took office, and William Gianelli
replaced Warne as Director of Water Resources. Gianelli's view of
the interim drain finance arrangement was considerably less
sanguine than his predecessor's. In a January 2, 1967 memo, he
wrote, "while many local districts have indicated their desire to
utilize the state's capacity in the proposed drain, I have not
detected a willinginess by these parties to pay for the state's
share of the costs of these facilities" (Gianelli, 1967b).
Gianelli questioned Warne's authority to initiate drain
construction under the 75 percent user fee, 25 percent water
bond, state share finance proposal. He noted that the
administrative precedent for this policy applied to state costs
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of a different type of project, and didn't cover jointly-financed
projects. He also argued that there was no assurance of recovery
of state capital costs in either case (Gianelli, 1967b; 1967c).
As Warne had done, Gianelli offered 28 valley irrigation
districts an oppportunity to sign drainage agreements at $16.00
to $20.00 per af. of effluent, and as before, they declined. In
March, DWR withdrew from the project, and Gianelli urged that the
Bureau begin construction of its own drain from the San Luis
Service area (Gianelli, 1967a).
As the USBR began construction on the middle part of the
drain in 1968, DWR started phasing out its drainage studies,
except for analyses of effluent from previously installed west-
side tile drains conducted with USBR. In June of 1969, Kaiser
Engineers released another major study done for USBR on the Bay-
Delta water quality control program. The report concluded that
chlorides and other dissolved solids in the drain would create no
significant harmful impacts in the Delta, and would even have a
slightly beneficial effect at low Delta outflow levels. The study
also found that nitrogen was not a limiting factor in Delta algal
blooms, implying that the drain would not increase biostimulation
(Kaiser Engineers, 1969).
However, by the time the study was released, the possibility
that the USBR would be able to extend the drain to the Delta was
rapidly slipping away.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CONFLICT FROM 1969 TO 1983; USBR'S ATTEMPT AT METHODICAL
CONCENSUS-BUILDING, AND THE NPDES PERMIT PROCESS
Though USBR kept the middle section of the drain under
construction between 1968 and 1975, it was never very likely that
the drain would be extended to the Delta. During this time, the
debate over the drain shifted out of committee hearings and
political meetings, and instead became the province of
administrative action. During the 1970s, the political climate
surrounding the drain changed as well, setting the stage for the
reintensification of the controversy that would begin in 1980.
A. Changes in the Political and Scientific Climate
The growth of the environmental movement and associated
regulations and research had wide-ranging external effects on the
conflict. For example, the passage of the National Environmental
Policy Act and the California Environmental Quality Act brought
the environmental effects of USBR's projects into public
scrutiny, and increased the procedural requirements for scoping
and hearings associated with agency plans.
As scientific understanding of water quality and ecological
issues increased, the issues broadened in number and became more
complicated. The number of actors involved in the debate,
directly and indirectly, also increased.
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
growing expertise in the field of water quality impacts affected
the discussion indirectly. The EPA offered the longest and most
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cogent criticisms of the USBR's 1972 Environmental Statement on
the drain and the San Luis Unit (USBR, 1972b). EPA hazardous
substances research provided part of the basis for drainage
effluent toxcicity studies required of USBR by SWRCB in the
1980s. Finally, EPA's investigation of water conservation and
salinity control methods in the Colorado River Basin's Grand
Valley was exemplary of research on agricultural practices
conduceted outside traditional agricultural agencies (EPA, 1978a,
1978b, 1978c, 1978d).
Following the passage of the Porter-Cologne Act in 1968, the
SWRCB gradually consolidated its authority to set Delta water
quality standards (SWRCB, 1978b:4-7). This processs was
complemented by the development of a lengthy EIR for the SWRCB's
water quality control plan for the Delta (SWRCB, 1978a) as well
as other studies of Delta water quality (SWRCB, 1974, 1980).
Because of the overall impact of the Central Valley Project
and the State Water Project on water levels in the Delta, DWR and
USBR also increased their ecological and water quality monitoring
programs in the area (DWR, 1975a; USBR, 1972a). New studies were
done on the Delta's entrapment zone, an area at the fresh
water/sea water tidal interface, containing high levels of
suspended nutrients and biota (Arthur and Ball, 1978; USBR,
1980). The California Department of Fish and Game did related
research, as did the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Calif. Dept.
of Fish and Game, 1972).
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B. Events in the Implementation of the Drain from 1967 to 1975
USBR construction on the middle stretch of the San Luis
Drain began in 1968, but was slowed by funding limits and slack
demand for drainage services. By 1979, 82 miles of the drain had
been completed between Kesterson Reservior, near Los Banos, and
Laguna Ave., in southern Fresno County (see Figure 6). The
reservior, which was designed to hold effluent until the drain
was extended to the Delta and to serve as a wildlife refuge, was
only a third of its planned size by 1979. At the same time, five
percent of the regional collector system was completed, and
subsurface drainage systems had been installed on only about
1,500 acres (Jackson and Paterson, 1977:144; IDP, 1979b:4-5).
Between 1969 and 1974, DWR slowly phased out its drainage
investigations, except for cooperative monitoring of drain water
from westside on-farm systems (Beck, 1983; DWR, 1981b). During
the same period, USBR planning activity continued at a relatively
low level. As required by NEPA, in October of 1972, the Bureau
released an Environmental Statement (ES) for the entire San Luis
Unit. The ES partially focused on the drain, but wasn't capable
of accelerating the drain's implementation.
At the time the statement was released, the only major San
Luis Unit facilities which had not been completed were 65 percent
of the local irrigation distribution system, one pumping plant, a
12-mile canal, and the San Luis Drain and drainage collection
system (USBR, 1972b:5-8). Hence, much of the statement rather
pointlessly described the environmental impacts and economic
justification for a project that was mostly in place (USBR,
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Figure 6. The San Luis Drain and Kesterson Reservior
source: USBR, February, 1984
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1972b:34-37).
Like many environmental statements written in the early
1970s, the 44-page San Luis Unit ES was very brief and lacking in
detail. Twelve pages of text were devoted to the drain, including
three pages of evaluation of eight alternatives to drain
construction. The alternatives to completion of the unit were
found to be too expensive, ineffectual, or economically unsound
(USBR, 1972b:34-40).
Most of the comments on the ES had little to do with
environmental impacts; the most lucid critique was made by the
EPA, which focused on the document's paucity of information. A
letter from the Contra Costa County Water Agency referred the
USBR to the earlier report by Metcalf and Eddy, and the Audobon
Society generally questioned repayment schemes (USRB, 1972b).
In late 1975, the Contra Costa County Water Agency sued the
Secretary of the Interior over the adequacy of the ES. A year and
a half later, USBR agreed that a new supplemental EIS would be
prepared (San Luis Task Force, 1979).
C. The Interagency Drainage Program, 1975-79
Frustrated by its experiences with the San Luis Unit ES, in
1974 USBR proposed a new "appraisal level" investigation of the
drainage problem (Swain, 1983). At the same time, DWR faced an
expansion of the salinity problem in its service area, which
prompted an interest in reviewing previous work and matching
interim drainage solutions to drainage problems to long-term
disposal plans (Beck, 1983). The result of these developments was
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the San Joaquin Valley Interagency Drainage Program (IDP), which
was specifically designed to bring more actors into the formal
planning process.
Funded by USBR, DWR, and SWRCB, the IDP operated as a quasi-
autonomous agency from 1975 to 1979, with general guidance from
its sponsoring agencies. The small IDP staff was assisted by
specialists from the parent agencies, EPA, the U.S. Soil
Conservation Service, the California Department of Fish and Game,
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and private consultants (IDP,
1979b:5-2).
Overall, IDP research efforts cost roughly one million
dollars, with about a million more being spent for in-house
drainage research by the sponsors (Beck, 1983). According to an
informal division of this work, environmental research and
formulation of a new EIR was done by SWRCB staff, the Bureau was
responsible for engineering and economic studies, and DWR handled
financing, "insititutional concerns," and engineering as well
(IDP, 1979b:5-3).
The IDP was geared for public participation. For example, a
"Public Advisory Committee," representing over thirty interest
groups affected by the drain committee, held nineteen meetings
during the IDP's existence. In addition, twenty-eight public
hearings were held in the valley and Bay Area.
1. The IDP's Recommended Plan
After four years of work, the IDP produced a "Recommended
Plan" for the drain, along with a new "first-stage" EIR.
According to this plan, the drain would empty into the Delta at
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Chipps Island in Suisun Bay, and would be built in stages. The
existing 82-mile segment of the San Luis Drain, would serve as
the first, middle section of the drain system. Five years after
this segment was completed, an additional 26 miles would be added
to the drain's southern end. Six years after that, the drain
would be extended north to Suisun Bay. If further studies
indicated that drainage effluent would cause no unacceptable
effects in the Delta, the drain would eventually be extended to
the DWR service area at the southern end of the valley trough
(IDP, 1979b:10-3, 10-6).
A relatively major innovation in the plan involved the use
of wildlife refuges, brackish marshes, and holding ponds as
reserviors for regulating the flow of water in the drain. Of a
total of 64,300 acres of marsh created, 45,300 acres would serve
as wildlife habitat, as part of the Pacific Flyway for migratory
birds (IDP, 1979b:10-7). The marshes would be flooded from
October to January, would discharge during high runoff periods in
the late winter and early spring, and, if possible, would be
farmed during the summer. The marshes were designed to allow
flexibility in discharging saline effluent into the Delta during
times when Delta flows available for dilution were at high
levels, both on an annual and year-to-year basis.
The marshes were also significant in that they garnered some
support from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the California
Department of Fish and Game, and valley Audobon Societies.
Further, because they were considered "environmental enhancement
features," the marshes could be excluded from regulations
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governing repayment of the project by its users (IDP, 1979b:13-
2).
Total undiscounted capital costs for the Recommended Plan,
including interest during construction, were set at a total of
$1,260 million in 1979 dollars, or, discounted at 6-7/8ths
percent, $679.6 million (IDP, 1979b:11-4, 11-5). Forty-two
percent of the discounted costs would be paid the state, and
fifty-eight percent would be carried by the federal government
(IDP, 1979b:12-4).
On-farm drainage systems would be paid for by individual
landowners. To secure repayment for the drainage system itself,
state and federal agencies would establish contracts with local
irrigation and drainage districts. The contracts would include a
surcharge on effluent received at collector drains, and also on
water applied to upslope farmland, which contributes to drainage
problems downslope.
Modifying the approach of the 1960s, the amount of repayment
required from local entities in areas served by state water
contracts would be determined by a per-unit levy on water
discharged into the drain. Thus, the user fee would be low in the
initial years of the project and would rise over time (IDP,
1979b:13-2). As will be discussed in Chapter 7, this proposal did
not necessarily reduce the financial ambiguity that has
contributed to farmers' reluctance to join the program.
2. Alternatives considered
In producing the plan, a large set of alternatives suggested
at early public meetings were screened, leaving five general
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"conceptual plans." These were compared to on-farm measures and
effluent reuse.
Of the conceptual plans, a proposal to drain farm lands to
evaporation ponds in lieu of the Valley Drain was considered, but
rejected because it would only localize and postpone salination
problems, while threatening groundwater around the ponds and
consuming enormous amounts of land. Damage to wildlife areas,
danger of salt-laden floods, and possible precipitation of
earthquakes were also given as reasons against implementing the
evaporation ponds scheme (TDP,1977:9).
The possibility of draining farm lands and discharging
effluent into the San Joaquin River, for eventual transport to
the ocean, was rejected because of the damage such a project
would do to the river and the high cost of diluting saline water
prior to release. Though regarded as the most ecologically sound
of all the alternatives, a plan to collect and pump saline
drainage water across the Coast Range, to a site on the Pacific
Ocean near Cayucos or Montery, was rejected becuase of its
enormous cost (IDP, 1976a:17-19).
A suggestion to reuse drain water after various
desalination, marsh management, aquaculture, and salt reclamation
programs were applied was rejected because of high costs and
problems in disposing of the highly concentrated brine generated
by desalination (IDP, 1979b:8-3, 8-6). By the mid 1970s,
environmental groups, especially the Environmental Defense Fund
(EDF) were beginning to argue that on-farm conservation of
irrigation water would reduce the quantity of waste water flowing
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beneath fields, thus reducing the necessary size of the drain. In
one page, the plan rejected these approaches, arguing that they
wouldn't have much effect and didn't address the real problem,
which was getting the salt out of the valley (IDP,1978:7-3). (The
water conservation and management alternatives gained increasing
prominence in the 1980s, and are analyzed in greater detail in
Chapter 7).
3. Environmental effects of the Recommended Plan
Compared to the environmental analysis of the 1960s, the
"first stage" EIR published with the Recommended Plan was a
qualitative leap forward in breadth and detail. The main points
of the analysis are presented in Appendix B, and summarized
below.
To predict the impacts of the drain on the Delta as it would
be operating around 2000, the EIR was essentially based on a DWR
computer model. From the model, the EIR concluded that the
drain's overall impacts on Delta salinity would not be very
significant, due to the flexible storage capacity of the drain
and the location of the discharge point. The EIR did suggest that
the CCCWA might occasionally have to alter its pumping practices
to maintain compliance with drinking water quality standards
(IDP, 1979b:15-28).
In trying to determine the drain's impact on algal growth
and eutrophication in the Delta, the model used by the IDP was
far more sophisticated than eariler analyses, but still contained
significant uncertainty. Though the drain wasn't expected to.
cause major biostimulation, nitrogen-removal facilities were
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included as a plan contingency (IDP, 1979b:15-29 to 15-34).
The EIR also considered the drain's possible impacts on the
entrapment zone, the shifting suspension of nutrients and biota
at the Delta's fresh water/salt water interface. The entrapment
zone is suspected to be a critical component of the ecology of
the Delta, especially for striped bass fingerlings, and happens
to be be located close to the drain's proposed discharge point.
Uncertainty in this analysis was high; nitrogen removal and
relocation of the discharge outlet farther west in the Delta were
given as general mitigation measures against negative impacts
(IDP, 1979b:15-34, 15-35).
The formation of trihalomethane (a suspected carcinogenic
product of chlorides or bromides and organic compounds which
forms during the chlorination of municipal water supplies) was
considered a potentially harmful impact of the drain. Among
several options, extension of the Contra Costa Canal (part of the
CCCWA water supply system) to a point further away from the
drain's outfall was seen as a preferable mitigation measure for
the trihalomethane problem (IDP,1979b:15-35).
In evaluating the possible effects of toxic substances
(pesticides and metallic elements contained in valley soils) on
aquatic life in the Delta, the IDP proposed its work as
preliminary, to be followed up in the early 1980s.
Compared to the USBR's 1972 San Luis Unit Environmental
Statement, the volume, breadth, and expertise reflected in the
comments section of the IDP's EIR were markedly greater. The most
detailed criticisms were levied by Bay Area governmental bodies;
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the Bay Conservation and Development Commission, the Association
of Bay Area Governments, the Contra Costa County Water Agency,
and the CCCWA's consultant on estuarine hydrology and
sedimentation, Dr. Ray Krone, a civil engineering professor from
UC Davis.
D. The NPDES Discharge Permit Process, 1979-1984
Following completion of the IDP's analysis in 1979, post-
Proposition 13 state budget cutbacks forced DWR to significantly
reduce drainage-related investigations, and the IDP was
dissolved. USBR again assumed the role of lead agency in the
development of the San Luis Drain (the name for the drain from
the federal service area), the implementation of which became the
essential first step in the completion of the entire Valley Drain
system (Swain, 1983).
Seeking an NPDES (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System) permit to discharge drainage effluent into the Delta,
USBR first turned to the EPA, which has regulatory jurisdiction
over non-point source discharges under Section 208 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. As expected, the EPA delegated
responsibility for a drainage discharge permit to the SWRCB,
which retains its authority under the Porter-Cologne Act and
Decision 1485, and section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Amendments of 1972 (Beck, 1983; Sacto. Bee, 1980c:18).
(Since 1980, DWR has cooperated with USBR in drainage
effluent monitoring, but has otherwise pursued independent
projects. Problems in meeting long-term water supply contracts
are more pressing for the Department, and drainage work has
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consisted mostly of interim coordination of local irrigation
agencies to ensure that short-term relief efforts match long-term
plans (Beck, 1983)).
1. The SWRCB Environmental Study Requirements
In order to adopt waste discharge requirements "that are
both realistic and ensure protection of the beneficial uses in
the San Francisco Bay-Delta estuary," the SWRCB required USBR to
complete another extensive series of studies on the drain's
environmental impacts, as inputs to its decision on USBR's permit
application (SWRCB, 1981a:1). In May of 1981, the SWRCB released
a twenty-three page outline of specific topics and acceptable
methodologies for these studies (SWRCB, 1981a), as well as
sixteen pages of "interim guidance" describing the form the
SWRCB's final permit might take, and the monitoring requirements
that might be associated with the permit (SWRCB, 1981b).
The studies required by the SWRCB were very similar to those
recommended by the IDP, and were originally expected to be
completed by the Bureau by late 1984, at a cost of about $4
million (Swain, 1983). The permit approval process called for
public hearings on USBR's published study plans. In these
hearings, the repartee over the impacts of the drain grew to new
levels of technical complexity. Both the Bureau and groups
opposing the drain or seeking more information on its impacts
hired scientific consultants and increased in-house analysis.
Compared to earlier studies, the SWRCB requirements
reflected new concerns, especially that the drain might deliver a
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range of toxic metals to the Delta, along with pesticides and
salt. This hypothesis was based on the unknown trace
concentrations of elements like boron, cadmium, molybdenum, and
arsenic in the soil served by the drain. SWRCB scientists' fears
were that the leaching and evaporation effects of the drain would
concentrate these elements.
1. Responses to the Bureau's study plans
In September, 1981, May, 1982, and January, 1983, the USBR
published reports on its study plans (USBR, 1982b, 1983a, 1983c).
Public hearings were held by the SWRCB concerning the first and
third of these reports, with the Bureau publishing comments and
responses (USBR, 1982a, 1983a).
Both the Bureau's progess reports and the comments on its
study plans contained a highly technical focus. Only fifteen
agencies, groups, and individuals issued comments on the
September, 1981 status report, and though eleven commentors were
present at the February, 1983 public meeting, only seven made
comments on the Bureau's toxcicity and monitoring programs.
Most of the comments published by the USBR on its study
plans came from the SWRCB, the Regional Water Quality Control
Board (RWQCB), the Central Valley RWQCB, the San Francisco RWQCB,
and the Contra Costa County Water District. The comments from the
former four agencies were made partially to keep the USBR
informed as to what it was expected to accomplish in its studies,
as well as to critique specific study requirements (Roefs, 1983).
Of the environe!ntal groups involved in the drain dispute,
only EDF and NRDC invested the time and money to develop a level
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of expertise great enough to allow credible criticism of the
USBR's study plans.
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CHAPTER 5
PLANS GO AWRY: THE DISCOVERY OF SELENIUM AT KESTERSON RESERVIOR
The Bureau had initially hoped to complete its studies and
submit a draft NPDES permit application to the SWRCB by January
of 1984, with public meetings to discuss the document following
(Roefs, 1983). Along with completion of the San Luis Drain, the
accompanying environmental statement was intended to cover plans
to increase the long-term committment of water from the San Luis
Unit to the Westlands Water District (USBR, 1983b). Following
completion of this document, the Bureau planned to ask Congress
for reauthorization of the San Luis Unit, procure new
appropriations, and have the San Luis Drain completed by the mid-
1990s (Swain, 1983).
However, by early 1985, the discovery of selenium-related
wildlife death at Kesterson Reservior had derailed USBR's plans
completely. The problem at Kesterson put the Bureau on the
defensive, galvanized its critics, and provided an opportunity
for environmental forces to reframe the entire debate. From
Kesterson, news of dying and deformed waterfowl found its way to
CBS's "60 Minutes" in the spring of 1985, as well as Time,
Newsweek, and major newspapers.
A. Initial Discoveries of Wildlife Poisoning
The first recent indications that selenium might be a
problem turned up in 1981, when USBR scientists detected levels
of 400 parts per million (ppm) in the waters of the existing San
Luis Drain (Carter, 1985f). (The Bureau and the Department of the
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Interior have been criticized for ignoring denying, and covering-
up the evidence of selenium and its harms, allegations discussed
in Chapter 7).
Selenium is an element contained in trace amounts in valley
soils. It is about as widely distributed in the earth's crust as
gold, and about ten times as toxic as arsenic. The distribution
of selenium throughout the valley was hardly studied until
recently; it is now understood that the selenium in Kesterson
Reservior comes from the Panoche Fan, a nearly flat, conical
section of soil from the eroded Coast Range, distributed over
time by local creeks (Figure 7)
In minute quantities, selenium is considered valuable in
human and livestock nutrition. However, through the leaching and
concentrating action of drainage systems discharging into the
reservior, selenium began building up in Kesterson in relatively
large quantities. In the reservior, selenium enters the food
chain through microorganisms living in the mud in the bottom of
the pond. Like many toxic metals, selenium bioaccumulates as it
moves through plants and up the food chain (Carter, 1985f).
Prior to 1981, the Kesterson Wildlife Refuge was fed by
fresh water. The effect of selenium on fauna at Kesterson was
first noticed in 1982 by the U.S. Department of Fish and
Wildlife. Prior to receiving drainage effluent, Kesterson
reservior supported largemouth and striped bass, catfish, carp,
and mosquito fish. Currently only mosquito fish survive, and they
containing 100 times the normal level of selenium (Bullock and
Meyer, 1984).
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Figure 7. Kesterson Reservior
source: USBR, February, 1984
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In 1982 also, Fish and Wildlife biologist Harry Ohlendorf
began what became the most widely-publicized work on Kesterson.
In 1983, Ohlendorf surveyed eggs in 350 nests of ducks, coots and
other migratory waterfowl, finding deformity rates of 17 percent
and embryonic death rates of 40 percent. The deformities were
particularly grotesque, including multiple beaks, and missing
eyes and legs (Harris, 1984a). Though he had discovered 100 coot
nests in 1983, he found none a year later. Ohlendorf found that
the weight of birds shot at Kesterson was 24% below that of birds
in a control group, and had selenium concentrations ten times the
average. The quantity of selenium in birds doubled between 1983
and 1984, by which time it was 25-34 ppm (Ohlendorf, 1985).
In other tests conducted in September of 1983, the
Department of Fish and Wildlife found that full-strength drainage
effluent was toxic to test fish in two days and invertebrates in
one day (Bullock and Meyer, 1984). Further research in 1984
confirmed that selenium was resonsible for the deaths and
mutations, and by mid-1985, the problems at Kesterson were
driving the conflict over agricultural drainage to new extremes.
B. Initial Policy Responses
Because one meal from a duck killed at Kesterson contained
thirty times the estimated safe daily dose of selenium, in 1983
the California Department of Fish and Game recommended eating
restrictions for local hunters and their families (Harris,
1984b). As the evidence got worse, in November of 1985, the
California Dept. of Health Services issued a more stringent
warning. Fearing for the health of immigrants from Southeast
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Asia, who forage for clams and crayfish in the area, in March of
1985 the Merced County Health Dept. began conducting blood tests
for selenium levels among local residents (Kane, 1985).
Between October of 1984 and April of 1985, three major
events generated by the Kesterson crisis which rearranged the
entire drainage debate. The first of these was the growth of
scientific studies on Kesterson and selenium, which removed
control of reseach on the technical aspects of the problem from
USBR's hands more completely than ever before. Second, lawsuits
and complaints from ranchers living near the reservior forced the
SWRCB to take action, eventually issuing an order requiring USBR
to close and clean up Kesterson. After trying to prevent the
SWRCB's action, the Department of Interior suddenly announced
that it was terminating delivery of irrigation water to 42,000
acres contributing drainage to the reservior, throwing the
proceedings into greater chaos. These events are described in
sequence below.
C. The Explosion of Research on Kesterson and Selenium, and it
Implications
As the situation unfolded in 1984, the Bureau first made
plans to extend its NPDES study plans two more years, and then
backed away from the permit process entirely. Searching for "hot
spots," and an understanding of selenium distribution in soils
throughout the valley, the U.S. Geological Service (USGS) started
a major research program, and the Department of Fish and Wildlife
expanded its research.
Scientists in California's major agricultural research
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universities (UC Davis, UC Berkeley, and Cal. State University
Fresno) were caught unawares by the problem. They quickly began
to organize conferences on selenium, bringing together the
exponentially growing number of chemists, soil scientists,
biologists, doctors, toxicologists, economists and the like
working on the problem in universities, government agencies,
consulting firms, and interest groups. Major conferences in May
of 1985 and March of 1986 were widely covered in the California
media. By 1985, it was estimated that 127 different studies were
being done on the effects of selenium (Davoren, 1986b).
As research on selenium grew, fears about Kesterson and its
policy implications spread to areas previously unconsidered. In
May of 1985, DOI asked the EPA to review its selenium standard
for water containing aquatic life, which had been set at 35 ppb
in 1980. Considering bioaccumulative effects, biologists were now
considering a supplemental standard for drainage water between 2
and 5 ppb.
1. Selenium in the Grasslands Water District
By the summer of 1985, it seemed possible that other parts
of the valley could be in for a disaster of proportions equal to
or greater than Kesterson. First among these areas was the
Grasslands Water District, a 52,000-acre seasonal wetlands north
of Kesterson. During the summer, much of Grasslands is dry, and
used for cattle pasture. Most of the land is leased or owned by
150 duck clubs, who pay the state user fees and hunt waterfowl as
they land in the marshes in the winter, migrating along the
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Pacific Flyway.
The water which keeps Grasslands wet comes from purchased
fresh irrigation flows, surface irrigation runoff, and subsurface
drainage water. These flows are generated on 94,480 acres in
western Merced and Fresno counties, of which more than half have
subsurface drainage systems. As at Kesterson, the water flowing
into Grasslands contains selenium, at an average concentration of
39 ppb, or a total amount estimated at 9,222 pounds per year
(Carter, 1985f).
Preliminary studies of Grasslands wildlife indicated that
the selenium may be bioaccumulating, possibly at a rate which
puts the evolution of problems one or more years behind Kesterson
(Hergessell, 1985). Tissue from 14 stilts tested in the district
contained 9.7 to 53 ppm of selenium, 5 avocets contained 47 to 85
ppm, 12 coots contained 3.3 to 30 ppm, and six gallinules
contained 6.4 to 44 ppm (Fresno Bee, 1985).
Another study argued that selenium levels of 4 to 5 ppm may
be enough to poison fish, and showed levels as high as 6.5 ppm in
fish from the San Joaquin River and 8 ppm in fish from nearby
sloughs. In Grasslands fish, selenium levels were measured at 10
to 14 ppm, and at 57 to 64 ppm in the San Luis Drain itself
(Sakai, presented at CSUF; Carter, 1985g).
Because of the potential size, complexity, and controversy
of the Grasslands problem, agencies have been reluctant to even
approach it (Hergessell, 1985). In response to the emerging
studies, in May of 1985, the Deputy Regional.Director of FWS
explained "We're not sure what we're seeing at grasslands," but
that the service is "relativeley confident we're not sending them
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into a death trap" (Fresno Bee, 1985). Environmental groups were
skeptical about this view, and charged that upper levels of FWS
are dragging their feet on the Grasslands problem (Fresno Bee,
1985).
In May of 1985, the California Department of Fish and Game
announced that it wouldn't use drainage water in wildlife
refuges. If no other water were available, biologists feared that
this would provoke a crowding and disease problem among nesting
birds. Further, agency scientists began making off-the-record
comments about how drainage water which used to be filtered by
Grasslands marshes would now be flowing directly to the San
Joaquin River, resulting in even higher concentrations (Carter,
1985g).
2. Research in other areas
Other findings on selenium were especially troubling to
field scientists working on the issue. For example, USGS
scientists are trying to understand the implications of the first
finding of high concentrations of selenium 1,900 ft deep in the
aquifer (Carter, 1985g). There are more than 17,000 acres of
evaporation ponds built by farmers in the Tulare Lake basin, and
questions are beginning to be raised about how they compare to
Kesterson. During 1985 and 1986, research on selenium spread to a
widening variety of topics, listed in Table 2.
Table 2. Summaries of Selenium Studies and their Policy
Implications.
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Nesting in Kesterson
As many ducks nested in Kesterson in 1985 as in 1984,
suggesting that the hazing program had failed. Five other
species of migratory birds are still nesting in the ponds
(Ohlendorf study; Harris, 1986)
Small mammals at Kesterson
Small Mammals in the Kesterson area have selenium levels up
to 1,000 times higher than a nearby control area. Tests on
large mammals and hawks are pending (Carter, 1985g).
Selenium in the area is threatening small mammals, and
through bioaccumualtion could threaten raccoons, coyotes and
the endangered San Joaquin kit fox. Donald Clark (Harris,
March 22, 1986)
Fish in the Delta, San Francisco Bay Estuary,. and_ San Joaquin
Selenium testing is in progress for ten species of fish and
shell fish taken from the Bay-Delta estuary below Antioch,
including herring, crabs and shrimp. Tests of a single
sturgeon (a long-lived bottwm dweller) caught in the estuary
indicated levels of 8ppm in liver tissue and 2.3 ppm in the
flesh, enough to put a three-ounce serving over the 200
microgram recommended daily allowance for adults established
by the National Academy of Sciences. Tests of striped-bass
liver tissue from the Delta were 1.7 ppm in 1984, and 2.32
ppm in 1985, with one bass showing a level of 8.5ppm.
Selenium levels in bass in the San Joaquin River were 1.77
ppm in 1984, and 1.93 ppm in 1985 (California Dept. of Fish
and Game study; Carter, 1986).
Threshold toxcicity in humans
Not much is known about the toxic effects of selenium on
humans at low levels. According to Arthur Kilness, an M.D.
who worked in areas of South Dakota which high soil selenium
levels, "cattle that eat selenium-rich weeds often stagger,
push their heads against solid walls, develop skin lesions,
lose the ability to swallow, and, in many cases, die within
24 hours." UC Berkeley conference, March, 1986) (Clemings,
1985c).
51
Table 2, continued.
Selenium in the air around Kesterson
Traces of selenium are found in the air around Kesterson,
but at levels below state public health standards (USBR, Nov
1984) Local ranchers claim 15-20 cattle have died in the
last three years, due to an "airborne, white dust that
covers everything" (Kane, mar 19, 1985). A USGS geologist
hypothesizes that on hot days, a chemical reaction in
Kesterson ponds could raise the selenium level in the air to
hazardous levels--"I would be hesitant to live there because
you're living in a selenium environment. It is essentially a
polluted environment." (CSUF Conference; Clemings, 1985c).
.Food arown in high-selenium soil
In theory, it is unlikely that selenium could poison crops
grown for human consumption, because people's food comes
from a large number of sources. Only people who continuously
eat vegetables grown in home gardens with high levels of
selenium in the soil or well water would have a problem (UC
Davis team).
A $420,000 study of selenium in crops and livestock
conducted by the California Dept. of Food and Agriculture.
was rejected as by the USBR. The study had severe problems
with conflicting lab results, due to errors in uncomparable,
highly sensitive lab testing methods. compounds (Carter,
1985d). The study also tested for chromium, nickel, and
other metals. It indicated average levels of selenium of 570
ppb in cantalope, 11 times the national average, but didn't
tie this finding to any level of public risk. The study also
suggested that selenium levels in livestock and dairy
products did not threaten public health. State Senate
President Pro-tem, David Roberti (D-Hollywood) called the
study "useless, bungled, and a travesty of scientific
review" (Dufur, 1985).
Selenium concentrations in wells, soil, and_ rivers in the general_
Ketrson area
The average concentrations of selenium in the 220,000 acre
Panoche Fan range from 2 to 2.5 ppm, reaching a high of 4.5
ppm. (USGS) According to selenium expert Dr. Arthur Kilness,
soils in South Dakota with similar concentrations caused
illness and death in livestoock which ate toxic
plants.(Carter, 1985g)
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Table 2, continued.
Selenium levels of 120 ppb were found in a 1,900 ft.
irrigation well in western Fresno County, far higher than
anything previously detected. (USGS) (Carter, Mar 13, 1985)
The practice of packing porous gravel around the caseings of
valley wells may be allowing shallow, contaminated ground
water to drain deeper into the deeper drinking water aquifer
(USGS) (Carter, 1985f).
Selenium concentrations in Mud Slough, which funnels drain
water into the San Joaquin River averaged 21 ppm, while TDS
was 1,425 ppm. Selenium levels in the San Joaquin River near
Newman reached 8 ppb in June of 1985 (EPA drinking water
standard is 10 ppb). (Carter, 1985f)
Distribution of selenium beyond the Panoche Fan area
The Sacramento Bee newspaper uncovered potential selenium
probTemsin wil'diffe refuges at 17-18 sites in six other
wesern states. The Bee's study consisted of looking over old
government maps and reports, consultation with biologists
and geologists, and collection of 40 water samples which
were analyzed by a private lab (Harris 1985b). This prompted
a DOI study of the same phenemenon, essentially an audit of
the Bee's work. DOI found selenium levels of 15 to 75 ppm in
duck ifvers in the Imperial Valley, an important farming
area in southern California near the Mexico border. The
Imperial Valley also has salinity problems, there, tile
drains discharge into the Salton Sea (Harris, 1985b).
Selenium levels in western Kern County soils (in the
southern end of the valley) range from .7 to 1.5 ppm.
(Carter, 1985g). Selenium traces were also found in the
McCloud river in Northern California (UPI, 1985).
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D . The SWRCB Cleanup Order
Provoked by the complaints and eventual lawsuit of a
landowner near Kesterson, in 1984 the SWRCB began exert its
regulatory authority. The SWRCB also had authority over Kesterson
though the Toxic Pits Cleanup Act, sponsored by Richard Katz (D-
Sepulveda--Los Angeles). The under the Toxic Pits Act, Kesterson
could be declared a toxic waste dump, bringing in a rubric of
SWRCB cleanup and abatement powers.
Acting under the Toxic Pits Act and Jim Claus' petition, by
late December, 1984, the SWRCB had released a draft proposal for
the cleanup of Kesterson. The proposed order required the Bureau
to double-line the ponds with layers of clay and plastic, which
the Board estimated would cost between $37 and $78 million. If
the Bureau didn't make progress toward cleaning up Kesterson in
three months, the SWRCB would order it to shut down the drainage
system entirely. A subdivision of thw SWRCB, the Central
California Regional Water Quality Control Board, would be given
two years to develop a long-term plan for solving the region's
drainage problems (Jones, 1984).
Hearings on the SWRCB's proposal were long, large, and
acrimonius, filled with farmers bussed in from the valley. Under
more pressure than they'd ever felt in lobbying for the drain
twenty years earlier, officials from farm organizations said the
SWRCB order could be the beginning of a showdown over the future
of as much as 500,000 acres of farmland in the valley which were
eventually scheduled for drainage (Jones, 1984).
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The Bureau repeated arguments from its study documents,
downplaying the health threat posed by Kesterson. The bureau also
emphasized the progress of its studies on proposed solutions,
which were supposed to be completed by 1989, at a cost of about
$30 million (DOI, 1984 a, 1984b, 1985a, 1985b, 1985c).
Environmental groups supported the SWRCB's order,
antagonizing the farmers. At a hearing held by the State Board of
Food and Agriculture, a Sierra Club spokesperson argued that the
SWRCB order to close Kesterson was necessary to attack the soil
salination problem, and that over the long term, drainage and
water price incentives should be set to keep only the best lands
in production. In response Board members asked him if it was
"incumbent to take positions like this aimed against agriculture
to keep your group going" through donations (Rodriguez, 1985).
The State Board of Food and Agriculture, the Fresno County
Board of Supervisors, and the Bureau asked that the SWRCB delay
its hearing on the final Kesterson decision, but the Board
resisted, and made its decision on January 8. Under the Board's
order, USBR was given six months to submit it plans to double-
line the reservior with clay, monitor potential leaks to
groundwater, and keep birds and fish away from Kesterson. The
USBR was given an extra two years to implement its plans; if
Kesterson couldn't be made safe by then, it would be shut down
and irrigation deliveries would be reduced to end the need for
drainage. The SWRCB order also set deadlines for alternative
drainage water disposal plans.
Following the SWRCB's decision, the Westlands WD filed suit
to overturn the cleanup order, in Merced County Superior Court.
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The basis of the suit was Westlands' contention that the SWRCB
was incorrect in classifying Kesterson water as hazardous waste
under the Toxic Pits Cleanup Act. Westlands also argued that
scientific evidence proved that Kesterson was not causing or
threatening to cause water pollution or nuisance. In the process
of filing its case, Westlands officials claimed that closing
Kesterson would force 49,000 acres of farmland which currently or
potentially drain into the refuge out of production (Fresno Bee,
1985).
E. The Department of Interior's Decision to Cut Off Irrigation
On March 15, the Department of the Interior (DOI, which
contains the Bureau of Reclamation, the Fish and Wildlife
Service, and the U.S. Geological Survey, among others) jolted all
the parties in the conflict with a suprise announcement on
Kesterson. Ostensibly afraid of prosecution under a migratory-
bird protection law, DOI announced that it was shutting off the
water supply to 44,000 acres of west-side farm land, which drain
into Kesterson. Farmers were outraged, politicians were stunned
that DOI hadn't consulted with them, and everyone else was
suspicious of DOI's motives. Three days after the announcement,
negotiations began which eventually modified its harsher terms,
but still left farmers under considerable pressure.
1. The terms of the announcement
The announcement was made at a hearing in the valley town of
Los Banos, which had been scheduled by congressman George Miller
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Jr. to criticize the federal government for its handling of the
Kesterson situation (Miller is the son of the State Senator from
Contra Costa County who criticized the drain in the 1960s, and is
chair of the appropriations committee which oversees the Bureau).
The hearing was intended to be a big event, and was attended by
seven members of Congress and the State Legislature, as well as
farmers, government officials, and interest groups (Salzman,
1985).
The day before the announcement, top DOI officials met to
discuss the next day's testimony, and a question about violating
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1917 (MBTA) came up. (The MBTA
was signed by the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, and provides for
misdemeanor penalties against killing birds which migrate along
the Pacific Flyway). In previous discussions, DOI attorneys had
maintained that the MBTA was not being violated at Kesterson
(Soiffer and Fogarty, 1985). However, that afternoon, DOI
Secreatry Donald Hodel asked top solicitor Frank Richardson about
the issue. After a quick study, Richardson responded, "I can't in
all judgement tell you your employees are not in violation of the
Migratory Bird Treaty," and the suprise announcement began to
take form (Salzman, 1985).
In California, at 5:15 the next morning, Carol Hallett,
Hodel 's western representative, got a call from Hodel as she was
getting out of the shower. Last-minute changes in the text were
made in Los Banos, leaving no time to brief anyone (Salzman,
1985). Hallett's basic message was that Kesterson would not be
shut down in three years, as the SWRCB had required, but
immediately. This would be done by terminating federal water
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deliveries to 42,000 acres of farmland, which directly or
indirectly are served by the drains which empty into Kesterson.
2. Response to the announcement
Waiting to give their testimony in criticism of the Bureau,
the announcement caught the entire hearing off guard. Hodel's
statement came just after farmers had planted their 1985 crops,
taking out major loans for seed and fertilizer.
Without water, an estimated $47 million worth of cotton,
tomatoes, and cantalopes would be lost. One grower testified, "my
name is Jim Gramis, ex-farmer as of about an hour and a half ago.
We're literally out of business. I expect the first phone call
when I return home is going to be from my banker" (Clemings,
1985a).
Hallett, a popular Republican and ally of California
farmers, left the hearing under armed guard. Upon returning to
Sacramento, she began phoning bankers, urging them not to panic,
and to wait a few days until the problems were solved (Salzman,
1985). However, as predicted, local banks quickly put holds on
all loans for the affected growers (Flinn, 1985).
The announcement made the front page of the New York Times
and the Boston Globe, and estimates of the economic damage soon
appeared everywhere. The Assistant Secretary of the Interior put
the loss to the local economy at as much as $70 million and 1450
jobs (Soiffer and Fogarty, 1985).
Politicians joined in a frenzy of criticism. Tony Coelho,
representing Fresno and Merced counties (and the likely House
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whip after Tip O'Neill's retirement) was most prominent. He
called the decision "insensitive," a "convenient cover," and "a
direct attempt to try to divert attention" from a federal
investigation of allegations that the Bureau had supressed
evidence on the damage at Kesterson (discussed below in Chapter
7; Borba, 1985c; Clemings, 1985c). State Assembly member Rusty
Areias (D-Los Banos) said "They dropped a real time bomb here
today" (Clemings, 1985a). Senator Alan Cranston called for an
independent set of studies, and Assembly member Jim Costa (D-
Fresno) alleged that the closure "will destroy the economy of
western Fresno County" (Clemings, 1985a).
Environmentalists were suspicious of DOI's motives. About
the MBTA, Hal Candee of the NRDC said, "The bureau has known
about that issue for a long time, and they should have been able
to bring it up for public discussion by now." Jim Claus'
attourney explained the basis of everyone's skepticism; "we have
discussed the migratory bird treaty act with the bureau over and
over again in the last year and a half, and they have always said
it didn't apply. So I was shocked to hear them this morning"
(Clemings, 1985a).
Summing up the political impact of the announcement, the
Fresno Bee editorialized:
[DG0's decision caused] outrage and despair among farmers on
the San Joaquin Valley's west side and destroyed whatever
credibility the Department had with those on both sides of
the issue. ...One can't help concluding that the initial
heavy-handness of the department's order had something to do
with its desire to shift the terms of the debate. The Bureau
of Reclamation is beseiged by critics and lawsuits. Its
competence and good faith have been challenged, with good
reason. ...It's as if the federal officials were dramatizing
the conflicting pressures on them by saying, in effect: Look
you want chaos? We'll show you chaos. We'll follow the law
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right out the window. Now tell us what you want to do about
it" (Fresno Bee, 1985a).
3. Negotiating a way out
DOI's announcement set off a scramble search for a way out
of the problem. About one-half of the farmers in the affected
44,000 acres have wells for pumping groundwater, but this didn't
fix their relationship with the banks. Local politicians
suggested that the Governor declare the land a disaster area, but
couldn't say how farmers would pay back the low-interest loans
this strategy would make available (Flinn, 1985).
Addressing the underlying drainage problem, other
politicians bandied about the possibility of shipping the waste
water south to Kern County. There it could to be transformed to
steam and injected into oil wells, to aid extraction. When USBR
began asking for $200,000 for a feasibility study, it became
clear that this was not a ready available alternative (Raimundo,
1985).
The real push for a way out of the straits DOI had created
came from the Westlands Water District. Following the
announcement, Westlands attorneys worked through the weekend, in
three days putting together a lawsuit against the government. The
suit asked for a 30-day restraining order, to be followed by a
permanent injunction. Fearing that the suit would also be used to
unravel the SWRCBs order, the NRDC came out in opposition. The
motivation, according to Hal Candee, was that "We're not just
talking about a technical violation of one federal statute--the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act--what we're talking about is an
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ongoing, serious threat to wildlife and the public health."
(Clemings, 1985).
After five hours of talks in Sacramento on March 18,
attorneys for Westlands and DOI announced that they might be able
to negotiate continued irrigation deliveries (Borba, 1985b).
Under an oath of silence, the talks continued in Washington for a
week and a half, as Coelho made positive announcements and the
press speculated about what was going on (Johnson, 1985a).
At the outset of the talks, the Sierra Club, NRDC, Consumers
Union and California Rural Legal Assistance sent letters and
telegrams to Hodel, asking that the irrigation water be kept
flowing. The also indicated they wanted to be part of the
negotiations, but were kept on the outside (Borba, 1985a).
On March 28, two weeks after DOI's announcement, the high-
level group of negotiators reached an agreement. The settlement
was that the Westlands WD would help its growers to somehow
reduce their flows to Kesterson by 20 percent every two months,
and that the reservior itself would be shut down completely by
July of 1986, two years before the SWRCB deadline. In addition,
the Justice Department agreed not to prosecute DOI officials
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. (Johnson, 1985a)
One plan for the disposal of the drainage flows called for
the purchase of 5,000 acres of extra land on the west side, where
fresh water would be mixed with drain water, and used to grow
salt-resistant forage crops. If this plan did not work, the
collector drains would be plugged at their source, meaning that
irrigation water would eventually resurface (Johnson, 1985a).
The dynamics of the negotiations can be reconstructed from
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statements made by a Fresno lawyer, Kendall Manock, a participant
who represented several Westlands farmers and lending
institutions. The role of water contracts as a binding force
between Westlands and the federal government, was a key issue.
According to Manock, "Our position to them was that, if there is
no integrity in the contract, then no one will buy your water."
Just as important was DOI's perception that shutting off the
irrigation water was necessary to stop flows to Kesterson (Borba,
1985d)
According to Mannock,
"They were not willing to separate the two issues until the
last two days of the negotiation. ...the key to the
negotiation was separating those issues. It finally turned
into a discussion about engineering, and Jerry Butchert
[Westlands General Manager] was the only engineer involved
in the decision. He told them that the only way the drainage
flows could be stopped would be to physically put plugs in
the whole drainage system ... that they couldn't shut off the
drainage by shutting off the irrigation water, because the
drainage is not just from the 42,000 acres (Borba,
1985d)
00I solicitor Frank Richardson, a former California Supreme
Court justice, played the role of a mediator, keeping the
negotiations going. According to Mannock, "There were very strong
feelings on both sides, but there was always the desire to get it
done, to get an agreement (Borba, 1985d)
The agreement with the Justice Department was the last
hurdle (Johnson, 1985a). Even after this part of the argeement
was ironed out, questions about the treaty remained, including
suggestions that Congress would have to modify the treaty to
apply to Kesterson, or that Hodel himself had the regulatory
authority to issue regulations covering the conflict. (Borba,
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1985d).
4. An analysis of DOI's actions
Even after the negotiated agreement, it remained unclear
what had provoked DOI into what was at best a highly questionable
political strategy. As the Bee commented,
"After years of depreciating the problems connected with
contaminated irrigation waste water, of brushing aside the
growing evidence that its drainage arrangements were a
dangerous failure, the Department of Interior unaccountably
made a 180-degree turn last week" (Fresno Bee, 1985a).
The notion that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act drove the
decision is barely tenable. The enforcement penalties in the Act
are not severe, a maximum of $500 in fines and 6 months in jail.
(Raimundo, 1985). Further, according to Tony Coelho, Article 7 of
the Act allows the Interior Secretary to prevent adverse effects
of the Act on agriculture, which could have left Hodel a
regulatory out (Borba, 1985c).
Two weeks after the suprise announcement, Hodel said he
recognized this possibility. In a written opinion of May 31,
Solicitor Richardson said he could find no previous case in which
a federal official had been "prosecuted for conducting otherwise
lawful activities." Richardson confirmed that Hodel has the
authority to "adopt suitable regulations permitting and
governing" the "killing... of any birds," though still could not
provide "the assurance" that employees would not be prosecuted
(Raimundo, 1985).
F. The Bureau makes Plans for the Kesterson Cleanup
In compliance with the SWRCB order, in early April, USBR
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released a four-part proposal for cleaning up Kesterson at an
estimated cost of $1.1 million. The Bureau first proposed to kill
some of the remaining fish and algae, by lacing the ponds with
rotenone. The Bureau would also spray vegetation around the pond
with wide-range herbicides (rodeo, diquat, and dalpon) and then
burn it. A chain-link fence would be built to deter foraging
Southeat Asian immigrants. In addition, the remaining drain
waters would be concentrated in four of Kesterson's twelve
seperate ponds (USBR, 1986).
The severity of the Bureau's plans met immediate opposition
from the USGS, who felt that concentrating the drain water would
increase the rate of flow to groundwater. Further, altering the
biological filtering system of algae and sediments on the bottom
of each pond was suspected to increase to concentration of
selenium in the pond water iteslf. Burning the selenuim-laden
vegetation would require permits from the County and the state
Air Resources Board; if local pollution levels from this activity
were too high, the Bureau proposed shipping the dead plants to
Fresno for incineration. Local ranchers also felt that the fences
would be ineffective, since the poeple foraging in the area would
simply climb over them (Carter, 1985c).
In a meeting of staff from the Bureau, the USGS, the Fish
and Wildlife Service, and the Regional Office of DOI, a new set
of alternatives for cleaning up Kesterson was agreed upon. These
included increasing public education and hazing efforts,
harvesting plant life from the ponds' surface (which birds feed
on), gradually drying up the ponds with the highest rates of
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groundwater flow, and killing everything in one pond and using it
for experimentation. Some birds and nests would be removed to
safer areas. (Stammer, 1985; Carter, 1985d).
Released in late April, the final final form of the Bureau's
program for beginning the cleanup of Kesterson reflected the
suggestions from the other agencies, as well as a provision for
the supply of 18,900 af. of fresh water for wildlife habitat in
Grasslands WD, and surface and groundwater monitoring. The second
stage of the Bureau's plan is the reduction of deliveries to
Kesterson by mid-1986 as agreed with Westlands (described below).
The final stage, removal of vegetation and pond sediment, is
awaiting approval from the SWRCB (according the USBR tests,
selenium concentrations in at least one pond exceed the level
defined as "hazardous waste"; USBR, 1986).
Estimates of the cost of this plan started at a minimum of
$2.9 million, which would escalate to somewhere between $37.3
million and $195.3 million if more extensive measures were
necessary. The main focus of this plan was halting drain water
flows to Kesterson, letting the ponds dry up, and possibly
covering the contaiminated soil. The Bureau remained committed to
burning vegetation in place, but would use incinerators to
prevent air quality problems, if necessary. The possibilities of
hauling the pond sediment to another disposal site, and pumping
contaminated groundwater back into the pond for evaporation were
also forseen (USBR, 1986).
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CHAPTER 6
POLICY-ORIENTED LEARNING; A FRAMEWORK AND METHOD FOR
UNDERSTANDING POLICY EVOLUTION
In the introduction of this paper, I suggested that the
evolution of the conflict over the drain has something to do with
how the participants have "learned" over time. This chapter
defines and clarifys this concept further, and tests theories on
policy-oriented learning against the empirical lessons of the
drainage case.
One type of learning relates to individual organizations.
Complicated political environments like the one surrounding the
drain offer numerous opportunities for achieving or frustrating
groups' goals. For example, the discovery of selenium at
Kesterson gave environmental groups a major new opportunity to
press their case against the Bureau. Many of the strategic
possibilities in a policy conflict take a less obvious form--the
ability of organizations to interpret evidence around them, to
discover and exploit these possibilities, is one manifestation of
policy learning.
A slightly different, but related, form of policy learning
is described in Heclo's study of changes in social policy in
Britain and Sweeden from 1900-1950 (Heclo, 1974). Heclo found
that demographics, economic conditions, and major changes in
political administration were responsible for only part of the
evolution of social policy during this period. Experimentation,
competition, and interaction among specialized groups involved in
social policy also produced important changes. In a sense, this
was the result of an accumulation of knowledge, or learning,
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across a policy system--not just within one group.
(As applied to organizations, "learning" is a metaphor. To
be more precise, individuals learn, and transmit their knowledge
to other individuals they are associated with; see Argyris and
Schon, 1978, pp. 18-20).
The phenomena of learning within organizations and across
policy systems has been studied by several authors (Heclo, 1974;
Argyris and Schon, 1978; Etheredge, 1981; Freedman and Freedman,
1981). The most clearly-defined model this phenemenona, which can
be tested against the empirical history of the drain controversy,
has been developed by Paul Sabatier (1985).
Hence, the next chapters rest on, and critique, Sabatier's
model. Sabatier has synthesized the work of the authors above, as
well as a broad literature on political psychology, policy
implementation, the role of analysis within bureaucracies, etc.,
into a theoretical framework.
A. Sabatier's Policy Learning Framework--A Brief Description
Sabatier's framework essentially treats learning as an
important facet of policy evolution. As the aggregate unit of
analysis, the emphasis of Sabatier's framework is on activity
within policy subsystems. These are the collection of parties
"who are actively--or potentially--concerned with a policy
problem" (Sabatier, 1985, p. 15; see Figure 8 for an overview of
the framework).
Events within subsystems are affected by both internal and
external forces. Some of the external forces which drive or
67
Figure 8. General Overview of Framework of Policy Cbange
(Sabatier, 1985)
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constrain subsytems may be relatively unalterable over long
periods of time. For example, the much of the basic character of
the drainage controversy is a result of the distribution of
perched water tables in the valley. Other external forces, such
as the leadership of important politicians like George Miller or
Tony Coehlo, are subject to more rapid fluctuation.
Inside subsystems, the key agents of change are "advocacy
coalitions," which are essentially groups of actors who share
common points of view, like the environmental and civic groups in
the Bay Area. The central premise of Sabatier's framework is that
the interaction of advocacy coalitions--who respond to each
others' activities as well as constraints and opportunities from
the outside--is what drives the process of policy formulation and
evolution. In turn, Sabatier sees individual advocacy coalitions
as motivated by their values and ideology. For example, the
Bureau's ideology is one of "makeing the deserts bloom;" its acts
by constructing water delivery systems.
At the heart of the framework, then, are belief systems,
which Sabatier elaborately describes and gives structure (drawing
from March and Simon, 1958; Lakatos, 1971; Axelrod, 1976; Putnam,
1976; and Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980, among others). Sabatier
divides the belief systems of advocacy groups into three parts,
outlined in Table 2.
The most fundamental, "deep core" beliefs include basic,
normative assumptions about society, nature, and the commonweal.
Among environmentalists who oppose the drain, deep core beliefs
might include the theme that water resources offer a wide range
of human and ecological benefits. Environmentalists feel that
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Table 2. Structure of Belief Systems of Policy Elites
(Sabatier, 1985)
Deep (Noraative) Core Near (Policy) Core Secondary Aspects
Defining
characteristics
Susceptibility
to change
Illustrative
components
Fundamental policy positions
concerning the basic strategies
for achieving normative axioms
of deep core.
Difficult, but can occur if
experience reveals serious
anosolies.
1) Ability of society to solve
problems
i) Zero-sum competition Ys.
potential for mutual
accomodation
ii) Technological optomisa vs.
pessimism
2) Identification of social groups
*hole welfare is most threatened/
critical
3) Proper scope of governsental
(vs. market) activity in
general
Instrumental decisions and
information searches
aecessary to implement
core policy positions
Moderately easy; this is the
topic of most adainistra-
tive and even legislative
policy-taking.
1) Most decisions concerning
administrative rules,
budgetary allocations,
dispostion of cases,
statutory interpretation,
and even statutory
revision
2) Information concerning
program performance, the
seriousness of the
problems, etc.
4) Proper distribution of authority
among various units (e.g. levels)
of government
5). Orientation on basic policy conflicts
e.g. environmental protection vs.
economic development
6) Basic choices concerning policy
instruments, eg. coercion vs. induce-
ents vs. persuasion
7) Desirability of participation by
various segments of society
8) Inference rules concerningbgeneral
seriousness of the problen
These categories apply both to the general beliefs of policy elites and to their beliefs concerning the specific policy
area in question. Our focus, however, is on the latter. The two need not be entirely synsetrical, i.e. it is conceivable that
a coalition will hold that, while the market is generally preferable to governmental activity, in cases of market failure (e.g.
externalities) that precept should be relaxed.
This links a specific world state (e.g. hiqh atmosphere concentrations of oxidant in many cities) to serious adverse
effects on priority values and thus to a willingness to adopt policy strategies which may impose signficant costs.
Fundamental normative and
ontological axioms
Very difficult; akin to a
religious conversion.
1) The nature of man
i) Inherently evil vs.
socially redeemable
ii) Part of sature vs.
dominion over nature
iii) Narrow egoists vs.
contractarians
2) Relative priority of various
ultimate values; freedom,
security, power, knowledge,
health, love, beauty, etc.
3) Basic criteria of distri-
butive justice: Whose
welfare counts? Relative
weights of self, primary
groups, all people, future
generations, non-human beings,
etc.
because of the intricate, interconnected character of natural
systems, coopting these benefits in favor of a single use- is not
in the public interest. (Belief systems for each of the groups
covered in this paper are discussed in detail in the next
chapter).
The "near core" of beliefs are about basic policies and
strategies for attaining values held in the deep core. In the
working world of policy debates, the near core is what fuels the
actions of groups and advocacy coalitions. For the Delta
interests, near core beliefs would encompass the need for careful
government regulation, and open, thorough study of projects which
alter flows in the Delta.
Finally, the "secondary aspects" of belief systems are those
which suggest the tools necessary to implement concepts from the
near core. For some environmental groups (ie., NRDC), filing
lawsuits and commenting on regulations might be indicated by
secondary aspects of a belief system. For another environmental
groups (EDF), secondary beliefs may inspire limited cooperation
with farmers, and research on alternatives to drain construction.
Because advocacy coalition interaction is based on belief,
it is important to Sabatier's framework that belief systems
remain stable over time. Sabatier takes a neutral position in the
debate over the causes of this stability, which could be economic
self-interest, ideology, or some mutually-reinforcing combination
of the two (this position is important, and we will return to
it). Once a belief system has been established, Sabatier
recognizes that powerful psychological forces predispose an
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organization to defend it. This impulse can lead to selective
recruitment and perception, manipulation of scientific analysis,
etc. (Schiff, 1962; Primack and von Hippel, 1974; Argyris and
Schon, 1978; Janis, 1983).
B. Beliefs and Advocacy Coalition Interaction--the Bases of
Policy Learning
Compared to more diffuse explanations of policy evolution
(Heclo, 1978, Kingdon, 1984), Sabatier's framework is firmly
grounded in his explication of what motivates advocacy
coalitions, that is, their belief systems. To clarify the
seemingly complex and even chaotic process of policy evolution,
Sabatier organizes his hypothesis around the assumption that
advocacy coalitions act to attain and defend their beliefs. The
distinction between core and secondary beliefs leads to specific
hypotheses about what form this action will take, and under which
circumstances competition between belief systems leads to policy
learning.
In general, as they attempt to attain their beliefs,
advocacy coalitions do many things. They try to recruit new
members, political support and resources. They attempt to learn
more about the basic attributes of the problems they face (like
the distribution of selenium in valley soils), and are
continually coping with changes in their political surroundings.
At the same time, they are attacking each other's assumptions and
proposals. In this process, scientific and technical analysis is
used both to better understand the nature of a problem, and also
as a weapon to discredit other groups and gain resources.
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To show how beliefs influence the behavior of advocacy
coalitions, Sabatier posits nine hypotheses, supported by many
references to the literature. In defining how beliefs relate to
learning and advocacy coalition activity, six of Sabatier's
hypotheses are most important to this study. The first two focus
on the role of beliefs in shaping the behavior of advocacy
coalitions and single actors:
1. Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial
concensus on issues pertaining to the policy core,
although less so on secondary aspects.
2. An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of
its belief system before acknowledging weaknesses in the
policy core.
The final four hypotheses are derived from the first two,
and describe the systemic effects of competition between opposing
belief systems, and the conditions under which this competition
generates policy learning:
3. Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most
likely when there is an intermediate level of informed
conflict between the advocacy coalitions. This requires
that:
a) Each have the technical resources to engage in such a
debate, and that;
b) The conflict be between secondary aspects of one
belief system and core elements or the other, or,
alternatively, between important secondary aspects of
the two belief systems.
4. Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most
likely when there exists a forum which is:
a) prestigious enough to force professionals from
different coalitions to participate; and
b) dominated by professional norms.
5. Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most
likely when there is an intermediate level of conflict
between the two. This requires that:
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a) Each have the technical resources to engage in such a
debate; and that
b) The conflict be between secondary aspects of one
belief system and core elements of the other or,
alternatively, between important secondary aspects of
the two belief systems.
6. When change in a governmental action program cannot be
restricted to the secondary aspects, on might wish to
hypothesize that adherents will seek to modify the core
in the following sequence: First, add a portion of the
opposing coalition's core; second, delete a portion of
the existing core; third, arrange a synthesis of the two
cores; and, finally, acquiesce to a replacement of one's
core by the challenger's, but try to get portions of [the
old, defeated] core incorporated into the new secondary
aspects. [This hypothesis is actually given in a
footnote, p. 46, but is one of Sabatier's strongest
statements about the relative difficulty of changing core
and secondary beliefs, and deserves to be tested].
The concept of policy learning is implicitly defined by
these hypotheses--it is based on the force of competition among
advocacy coalitions and their beliefs. From the perspective of an
organization or coalition seeking to attain or revise it beliefs,
learning can be about a variety of things (Sabatier, 1985):
1. Improving one's understanding of the state of variables
defined as important by one's belief system (or,
secondarily, by competing belief systems--an example of
this would be the Bureau's research on the toxic effects
of drainage constituents on fish in the Delta).
2. Refining one's understanding of logical and causal
relationships internal to a belief system. (For example,
in the early 1980s, EDF tried get the Bureau to
incorporate an econometric model into the Bureau's study
plans. The model would have predicted how farmers' water
conservation response to drainage effluent charges.
3. Identifying and responding to challenges to one's belief
system (such as growers' response to threats of
irrigation shut-off imposed by Kesterson).
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C. A Method for Testing the Framework
The test of Sabatier's framework has three steps. Because
beliefs are the basis of interaction, the first step is to
describe these beliefs, for major groups involved in the drain
conflict. The nature of water politics in California makes it
important to specfiy precisely the advocacy coalitions involved
in the drain debate; this is part of the process of specifying
belief systems.
The second step is to take a closer look at the events which
have validated beliefs, or put them under pressure. In the case
of the drain, these fall under a variety of categories, which are
described. Finally, the paper examines individual groups'
responses to the challenges they have faced, commenting on the
degree of learning which has taken place within groups, and the
ways in which beliefs have been modified. This notion of revision
and modification of beliefs, as reflected in the real experiences
of groups involved with the drain, is compared to Sabatier's
hypotheses, and points of revision or clarification are
specified.
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CHAPTER 7
BELIEFS UNDER PRESSURE
A. Subsystems and Advocacy Coalitions--Comparing Theory and
Experience
This section takes the ideas about beliefs and learning from
the last chapter, and applys them to the case at hand. The first
step in doing this is to describe the advocacy coalitions; then I
describe their beliefs.
According to Sabatier, advocacy coalitions will be held
together by common beliefs (values), and will be quite stable
over periods of about a decade. Advocacy coalitions will show more
agreement on core beliefs than secondary ones, and "coalitions of
convenience" across advocacy coalitions will be infrequent
(Sabatier, 1985).
1. California water politics--broad advocacy coalitions with
shifting membership on specific issues
It is easy to deliniate two advocacy coalitions in the case
of the drain, but it is difficult to describe their boundaries.
This is because the key themes and issues of the drain conflict
share much in common with other California water controversies.
(This is akin to a typical problem in environmental disputes,
where the problem overlaps several political jurisdictions;
Susskind and Weinstein, 1981).
The two obvious advocacy coalitions are the water supply
agencies and the environmental/Delta protection coalition.
However, these coalitions battle over far more than the drain,
and the actual participants on each issue vary in subtle but
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important ways.
This point can be highlighted by introducing more of the
cast in California water politics. Among environmental groups,
the Friends of the Earth haven't been significantly involved in
the drainage dispute, but played a major role in the battle over
the Peripheral Canal, described below. The Sierra Club has been
involved in the drainage issue since Kesterson, but in northern
California pays more attention to conventional water pollution
issues and the Peripheral Canal.
The Bay Institute of San Francisco monitors public agencies
who are supposed to protect enviromental quality in the Bay and
Delta. It also does limited scientific analysis, and has recently
been woking at publishing and disseminating information from the
university selenium conferences. Many more groups are active on
toxic waste and groundwater contamination, preservation of wild
and scenic rivers, and on specifically local water issues.
The SWRCB, while acting as a reluctant political broker over
the Kesterson crisis and the Bureau's NPDES permit, has other
functions. It controls both water rights in the Delta and San
Francisco Bay, and is also responsible for environmental quality
regulations in those areas. Its regional boards exercise similar
functions for other watersheds, in San Francisco holding
authority over permits for toxic waste tanks and bay infilling.
The Bay Conservation and Development Commission is a large,
intergovernmental body, which controls permits for filling and
dredging in San Francisco Bay.
Aside from water districts like Westlands, California
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growers exercise their power through the California Farm Bureau,
private lobbyists, and a large number of trade organizations
(Blanton, 1982).
The work of a few key legislators, like George Miller Jr.
and Tony Coehlo in the House of Representatives, and Richard Katz
in the State Assembly have already been mentioned. Finally, an
important client of DWR's State Water Project is the Metropolitan
Water District of Suthern California (MWD), which coordinates
supplies and contracts for 27 water agencies around Los Angeles
and San Diego. Because southern California reps. control the
state legislature, the MWD is an important lobbying force.
The point of this list is that, a priori, it is not always
easy to tell who will be most active in a water policy dispute
like the drain. Further, as discussed in Chapter 8,
environmental/protectionist interests since the late 1970s have
been modifying their working philosophy about resource policy,
which makes beliefs harder to specify. The changes reflect the
idea that natural resources should not be subsidized, but priced
at their "real" value to society, for more efficient use and
environmental protection.
The primary theoretical work on the use of markets as
regulators of resource use was done by Resources for the Future in
the 1960s and 1970s (Kneese and Bower, 1968). However, as a tool of
environmental activism and analysis, many others groups have adopted
this view, at differing rates. As discussed below, EDF has been an
especially strong and successful proponent of the market approach in
California water policy (Willey, 1986)
Applying Sabatier's theory to the drainage dispute, this
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leaves the environmental/Delta protection coalition fuzzy around
the edges. This is even more the case for a third possible
advocacy coalition, valley growers. As will be discussed in a
section below, growers' support for the drain has varied
substantially, depending on the size and location of their
properties, and their relation to federal agencies and water
supplies. Thus, while growers form explicit advocacy coalitions
around other issues, they usually haven't in the case of the
drain, or at least until the Kesterson shut-down threatened their
interests.
2. Defining belief systems
Despite the ambiguity of advocacy coalition boundaries, it
is useful to set out belief systems explicitly. In doing this, I
haven't had the resources to do a content analysis, cognitive
mapping exercise, or convene a panel of experts, as Sabatier and
other suggest (Axelrod, 1976, Sabatier, 1985). Instead, I used my
judgement to make the lists, and simply asked experienced people
I interviewed what they thought, particularly about belief
systems other than their own. Tables 3, 4 and 5 display the
outcome of this exercise.
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Table 3. Water Supply Agencies' Belief System
Deep (normative) core:
Water supply agencies help farmers face natural adversity by
delivering water, for the benefit of society.
Engineering planning can harness water resources for more
productive use by human society.
Near (policy) core:
Agencies should be oriented to large scale projects and
long-range system planning, incrementally drawing water
supply sources into a regional distribution network.
The best way to convince Congress to support projects is
through showing of local need and interest.
Agriculture in the San Joaquin Valley plays an important
role in feeding the nation and maintaining the economy of
the region, and should be protected from soil salination.
Salts should be removed via a drain to the ocean, "the
ultimate salt sink."
The Delta is an important resource, but careful planning and
regulation of drainage flows can minimize harmful impacts.
In-valley alternatives to the drain are not feasible. In the
long term, they do not remove salts from the valley, will
not have a significant effect on the problem, and are too
costly, both in economic and environemntal terms.
Secondary Aspects:
Drain design features: placement of marshes, location of
drain outfall, construction of treatment plants. Also,
content of impact studies.
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Table 4. Belief System for Environmental/Protectionist Coalition
Deep Core:
Water resources have many values, which are subtlely
and intricately connected to essential human and natural
needs. Diverting water resources for a singular purpose,
without recognizing these connections, is shortsighted and
not in the greater public interest.
Near Core:
The Delta is a unique natural resource furnishing a wide
variety of benefits to a great number of people. It should
be protected against harm from pollution sources which might
be individually small but have a large aggregate impact. It
is important to recognize the interconnected ecological
character of Delta resources.
The salts, metals, nutrients, elements, and other
chemicals contained in drainage effluent will do major damage
to the Delta ecosystem.
USBR and DWR, who built the California water projects and
want to build the Peripheral Canal, pay more attention to
their agricultural constituents and self interest than to
the Delta. Information on drainage impacts and careful
regulation is required.
In-valley alternatives to the drain are more
feasible and economical than the agencies concede, and
should be fully tested.
The drain should not represent an inequitably broad subsidy
to valley agriculture, which already exports large volumes
from the Delta.
Secondary Aspects:
Details on in-valley alternatives (conservation, solar
ponds, etc.). Differences in strategies, eg., lawsuits,
economic analysis, cooperation with growers, disseminating
information, working in the legislature, grassroots
organizing.
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Table 4. Farmer's Belief System
Deep Core:
Working between an array of only partially predictable
natural forces and a set of consumers who don't really
understand the scale or difficulty of agriculture, farmers
work hard and successfully feed the nation and a good part
of the world.
Near Core:
Farmers deserve subsidies to buffer natural and market
perturbations, to assure a steady food supply and meet the
needs of consumers.
Farmers have to use modern industrial methods (chemicals,
specialized equipment, large holdings, large water projects,
big packing houses, an enormous marketing and distribution
network) and a labor force willing to do difficult work if
they are to produce a large volume of crops.
Farmers should only be required to pay a fraction of
drainage costs. Should salination be a problem and the
public not be willing to support the costs of a drain, over
the short and medium term, farmers will use other
alternatives, if they are available and economical.
Decisions about use of farm inputs should be left in the
hands of individual growers, or their local representatives.
If economic interests are threatened by natural of
technological problems, growers should innovate in
proportion to the threat. If interests re thFeatened by
political forces, growers should organize in proportion to
the threat. Usually, this will mean letting existing
insitutions (like Westlands and the Farm Bureau) represent
farmers' interests. If problems are severe enough, or
neglected by existing institutions, growers should organize
at whatever level they are capable.
Secondary Aspects:
Willingness to support the drain, depending on how much it
costs. Use of evaporation ponds, water recycling, discharge
into the San Joaquin River, etc., as means of coping with
salination in the absence of a drain.
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Part of this paper's consideration of organizational
learning is based on how the groups studied here have responded
to three important issues (ie., challenges to attaining their
beliefs). These issues have repeatedly surfaced, in changing
forms, through the course of the controversy. The first reflects
the inability of DWR or USBR to arrange suitable finance
mechanisms. The second relates to the accumulation of scientific
evidence against the drain, especially after selenium was
discovered at Kesterson. The third is about the search for
alternatives to the drain, especially as promoted by
environmental groups.
B. The Continuing Problem of Drain Finance
Historically, demonstrations of local support in legislative
hearings have been a key element of DWR and USBR's strategy for
obtaining funds. The relationship is reciprocal; because water
pricing laws in the valley are structured so that municipal users
subsidize owners of large, unimproved tracts, incentives exist
for farmers to lobby for larger water projects. Coupled with the
fact that key appropriations subcommittees used to be dominated
by western and valley legislators, this "iron triangle" provided
a potent means of getting funds.
However, one of the fundamental facets of the drain case is
that farmers' support for the drain has been intermittent, at
best. In a speech before the California Alfalfa Symposium, DWR's
Louis Beck explained that "a solution to the drainage problem has
been slow because no single group has pressured state and federal
agencies, and because the necessary 'salt sink' is something no
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one wants" (Bryant, 1983). The water agencies' continued
inability to solve, or even come to grips with this problem is an
important gauge of their ability to learn (elaborated below).
According the the IDP's estimates, the maximum area
requiring drainage will approximately double between now and
2000, and will double again by 2085 (see Table 1). This long-term
character of returns on drainage investment is somewhat obscured
by the one-hundred year discounted projections of drainage
benefits used in the IDP's report (IDP, 1979b:E-2). Even if
valley growers are experiencing $35 million per year in salt-
related losses, the development of San Joaquin Valley agriculture
has not exactly been crippled by salination since the problem was
noticed in 1955. Hence, up until Kesterson, though some growers
might experience increases in yields from installing tile drains,
for most growers, the immediate onus of drain financing has
apparently outweighed the more distant ramifications of soil
salination. In comparison, Delta interests have always wanted to
stop the drain from being constructed at all, believing that even
if inital volumes of drainage effluent were small, once the drain
is built, long-term increases in pollution will be difficult to
prevent.
Farmers' attitude on the drain have also varied according to
the cost and availability of medium-term alternatives. When the
Westlands Water District was expanded to include the 150,000 acre
Westplains Water District, Westplains users were willing to pay
for drainage in return for asssurance of irrigation supply. In
the northern valley, where existing tile drain systems empty into
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the San Joaquin River, the drain is opposed because it would
raise costs for a service some farmers already recieve for free.
In the southern valley, openended contracts for discharge into
the drain proposed by the IDP caused fear among growers that
initial charges of $20 per acre for discharge would grow to $250
per acre in twenty years (Beck, 1983). Many growers in the
southern valley are using evaporation ponds to relieve salination
problems over the next 15 to 20 years.
C. Controversy Over the Drain's Impacts--The Partisan Use of
Scientific Analysis
As described in Tables 3 and 4, the core beliefs of the
water supply agencies and the environmental/Delta protection
coalition are in direct conflict on the issue of environmental
impacts of the drain. In analyzing how this has affected
coalition interaction, this section first sifts through the
literature on science and public policy. This literature survey
predicts treatment of scientific and technical issues in a way
which corroborates Sabatier's framework, as does my
interpretation of how groups involved in the drain conflict have
actually acted.
1. Some definitions
By scientific analysis, I refer to research and analysis
originating in the physical or natural sciences on the basic
attributes of a policy problem. In the case of the drain, the
most important of these branches of the sciences include biology,
toxicology, hydrology, chemistry, soil science, and geology. An
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example of scientific research on the drain's impacts would be
Harry Ohlendorf's study of waterfowl deformities in Kesterson
Reservior. Scientific analysis is more encompassing, and includes
synthesis and interpretation of findings from more than one piece
of research. An example of this type of analysis would be the
Bureau's attempts from 1980 to 1983 to project the toxic effects
of drainage effluent on aquatic life in the Delta.
Technical analysis refers to engineering and economic study
of the attributes or feasibility of a project. This type of
analysis can also imply narrowly-focused research, or a broader
interpretation of technical possibilities. Westlands' study of
whether local evaporation ponds could affordably meet the demand
for drainage discharge produced by the closure of Kesterson is an
example of this type of analysis (which is discussed further
below).
Policy analysis implies information directed at decision
makers and other interested parties, which describes alternatives
and weighs impacts of different policy proposals. Such analysis
may be highly quantitative, and in theory will account for
impacts of a proposal along different dimensions of value, such
as equity, economic efficiency, environmental effects, impacts
over the long and short term, and possibilities for
implementation.
From these definitions, the key point is that scientific and
technical analysis reflect the efforts of highly-trained
specialists. The results of this analysis are one of several
factors which influence policy decisions.
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2. Perspectives on science, policy analysis, and politics
Scientific and technical analysis has played a major role in
the dispute over the drain. The drain itself and the irrigation
projects which brought water to the valley are the result of
extensive work in civil engineering. The steadily growing list of
fears about impacts in the Delta and from selenium at Kesterson
have had an obvious effect in galvanizing opposition. As will be
discussed in the next chapter, technical and economic appraisals
of alternatives to the drain will be an important determinant of
farmers' eventual fate.
However, even in cases where scientific and technical issues
are critical in understanding a topic, policy decisions will
clearly reflect more than the scientific content of an issue.
Policy analysis, and the push and pull of interest politics are
at least as important in the formulation of public policy. Many
debates on science policy are not immediately about technical
issues, but who participates in making decisions where technical
issues are involved (Nelkin, 1979). The interaction of science,
policy analysis, and politics is the subject of a large volume of
research, which I will briefly interpret before turning back to
the drain (Schooler, 1971; Schmandt, 1984; Jenkins-Smith, 1985).
Most of the major works on science and policy address a
variety of issues (Primack and von Hippel, 1974; Nelkin, 1979).
Though policy disputes containing technical content are not so
nicely packaged in reality, it will help here to separate clearly
different dimensions of these disputes.
A portion of the literature is about "science policy,
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strictly construed. The emphasis is on how to fit the process of
government regulation or intervention to programs which are based
on scientific research and invention, such as genetic engineering
(Bereano, 1984). On the whole, the story of the drain (as
agricultural economic development) is broader than this.
A major portion of the literature centers on the means of
integrating scientific and technical analysis into the broader
practice of policy analysis and decision-making. Almost all of
this work takes into account the role of politics and
bureaucracy, but from different perspectives.
Some authors emphasize methodological issues, such as the
role of cost-benefit analysis or computer simulation modeling
(Fischoff, 1978). The use of uncertainty or risk assessment in
designing policies which have a wide range of justifications and
impacts is another common topic (Lowrance, 1974).
Basic communication between experts and policy makers can be
problematic in and of itself (Brooks, 1984). This is typically
the case when credible experts disagree on the technical
underpinnings of a problem, or on the policy implications of
technical evidence, but no one else knows how to interpret the
experts' differing opinions (Ozawa and Susskind, 1985).
Rein and White (1977), and Wildavsky (1979) treat the role
of policy analysis which may have a high technical content in
broader, conceptual and institutional terms. Among other things,
these authors describe the swirl of political and bureaucratic
forces which surround the would-be "objective" analyst. So that
practitioners can cope with these pressures, and learn to tailor
complicated analyses so they will receive the attention they
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deserve, other authors recommend the best ways to "speak truth to
power" (Enthoven, 1971; Lehman and Nelson, 1981).
3. The partisan use of scientific analysis--expectations for
the drain case
The purpose of setting out all these variations in
perspective on science and policy is to distinguish them from the
ideas which are most important in the case of the drain. These
come from a final set of literature, which describes the stark
landscape beyond science policy, beyond the balance of scientific
evidence and policy analysis, beyond means by which the well-
intentioned analyst can reckon with institutional reality. In
this harsh terrain, politics and bureaucratic concerns dominate
all the other reasons for conducting scientific analysis
(Rushevsky, 1984).
The partisan use of scientific information partially derives
from decision makers' thinking on highly controversial issues.
For example, one congressman, asked if he considered scientific
advice in making policy decisions replied: "We don't. That's
ridiculous. You have a general posture, you use the scientist's
evidence as ammunition. The idea that a guy starts with a clean
slate and weighs the evidence is absurd" (Kingdon, 1973, quoted
in Jenkins-Smith, 1985).
Struggles for resources within and among agencies lead to
other pressures to politicize science (Downs, 1967). Offering
advice for staffing agency technical units under these
conditions, Margolis (1974, pp. 33-34) suggests:
(1) Seek to formulate the overall issue so that the problems
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on which you can speak with the greatest authority are
critical.
(2) Seek to frame the technical issues in a way which
supports your policy position.
(3) Do not give away information which does not support your
policy position; insofar as possible, avoid complying with
requests for information which is likely to be used against
your position.
(4) Assume all representatives of viewpoints other than your
own reflect some appropriate combination of bias, ignorance,
or incompetence.
(5) Act on the assumption that other participants in the
process are either (a) operating according to these rules,
or (b) do not understand what is going on.
(...to be taken "in reasonable doseage").
In support of their "Ten Commandments for Policy
Economists," Lehman and Nelson (1981) suggest that Margolis'
advice is taken seriously in the Department of the Interior. The
authors' recommendations ("discount for political demand," "dare
to be quick and dirty," "think like a manager," etc.) were based
on their experience work in DOI's Office of Policy Analysis. (The
office was established in 1973 to increase economic analysis of
bidding systems, fair market value, leasing systems, and rates of
resource production, to the management of federal energy, land,
and water resources).
According to Lehman and Nelson, agencies within DOI often
base their policies on measures of physical or biological output,
not economic costs and benefits. For example, when the Forest
Service finally applied economic analysis to its timber sale
policies, it found that 22 percent of sales failed to cover their
costs (Lehman and Nelson, 1981:98).
Major planning and evaluation exercises were done in the
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Fish and Wildlife Service in 1976, the Forest Service in 1975 and
1980, and the Soil Conservation Service in 1980. These turned out
to be "primarily rationalizations to justify higher expenditures,
rather than serious efforts to shape policies and priorities"
(Lehman and Nelson, 1981, pp. 108-109).
Most relevant to this study, the Bureau of Reclamation "for
years turned out benefit-cost studies that seemed suspiciously
favorable" to its institutional interests (Lehman and Nelson,
1981, p. 106; Hanke and Walker, 1976). Prior to the Carter
Administration's attempts to reform water policies in 1977;
[Despite the fact that] large scale dams and other water
projects would appear to provide good subjects for economic
analysis. ...between 1974 and 1976, the Office of Policy
Analysis came to the conclusion that analysis in the water
resources area was largely a waste of time; water decisions
by long tradition had been so charged politically that
economic analysis had a low payoff. (Lehman and Nelson,
1981, p. 101)
4. Partisan use of scientific analysis--responding to
opportunity, packaging ideas, and supressing evidence.
High controversy and institutional self-interest are both
integral features of the evolution of policy on the drain. We
suspect that in this case, organizations may try to use
scientific analysis for their own ends in a number of ways. These
include drawing the overall boundaries of analysis in a favorable
way, controlling the methods of analysis, altering results, and
suppressing or attacking research by competitors. I will make the
case that this has been the Bureau of Reclamation's policy, as a
response to threats to its core beliefs posed by the actions of
environmental and regulatory groups (like the SWRCB) trying to
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realize their core beliefs.
Organizations which are in conflict with groups who may be
using these strategies will not be able to simply reply with
better science. As the drain conflict shows, they must market and
package their analyses, to be convincing and palatable to those
they are trying to convinvce. I will argue in the following
section, and in Chapter 8, that the Envronmental Defense Fund has
been best at doing this. NRDC's use of technical analysis has
been more antagonistic toward farmers and water agencies, and has
served a different political purpose. I will show that this is
also a reflection of core beliefs, EDF being more oriented toward
economic analysis (in this case), and NRDC being more
adversarial, and concerned with turning public opinion against
the Bureau.
Sabatier implicitly argues, and I agree, that groups seeking
to reduce the political use of scientific argument should force
competitors into forums where scientific work can be closely
scrutinized by their peers. This has happened in the Selenium I,
II, and III conferences held by the University of California. In
these conferences, the U.S. Geological Survey especially has had
an opportunity to criticize the Bureau. This was not so much the
case during the SWRCB discharge permit study process, which was
more closed and adversarial.
5. Evidence of misuse of scientific analysis by the Bureau
Many scientists in other agencies (as well as conservative
engineering consultants I've interviewed) were suspicious of the
Bureau's fastpaced study plans for the NPDES permit process.
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Later, as the first studies were being done at Kesterson,
the Bureau insisted on using its own data on concentrations of
selenium and other metals. It held this posture until the USGS
issued a harsh critique of its methodology (Davoren, 1986a). USBR
officials first detected selenium levels of 400 ppm in June of
1981, in the studies which were to be presented to the SWRCB in
1984. However, the official who conducted this part of the study,
since retired, says that a study of the literature on selenium
didn't yield any information that would have predicted the
problems that arose, and that figures for average levels of
selenium in drainage waters throughout the valley hid the high
concentrations at Kesterson (Carter, 1985e).
A longrunning controversy over these issues emerged in 1983,
provoked by Felix Smith, a staff scientist for the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, which is also part of DOT. In September of that
year, Smith tipped a Fresno Bee reporter to the discovery of
wildlife deformities at Kesterson. In May of 1984, he also told
reporters about a secret meeting held by the Westlands WD and the
Bureau. At Smith's suggestion, the Fresno Bee used the Freedom of
Information Act to obtain previously unreleased documents. He
also turned over documents to reps. George Miller and Robert
Matsui (D-Sacramento). He alleges that these memos show that the
DOI Solicitor's office was trying to suppress the results of
studies by FWS employees (Smith, 1986). Under many threats to be
transferred to Oregon, in late 1985, Smith was granted federal
"whistleblower" protections by Congress. That year, Smith also
received the prestigious Stephen T. Mather award from the
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National Parks and Conservation Association (Carter, 1985k).
Before Smith, another FWS appraiser working in the
Grasslands WD in the late 1970s and early 1980s had resigned. He
complained that his superiors had told him to "develop amnesia"
over Grasslands' problems (Carter, 1986d).
The head of the UC College of Natural Resources, who
organized the three selenium conferencs, in March of 1986 again
argued that high-level officials in FWS were suppressing reports
by Ohlendorf and Sakai (Harris, 1986).
A congressionally-authorized study of the Bureau's alleged
coverup was conducted by DOI's Inspector General's office. The
study was critical of the Bureau and 00I's treatment of the FWS
studies on Kesterson, and found "enormous conflict" among federal
officials. However, it found no actual conspiracy to supress the
FWS evidence.
D. Water Conservation, Solar Ponds, and Water Marketing as
Alternatives to the Drain.
As described in Chapters 2-4, alternatives to the drain were
not given serious consideration by either DWR or USBR during the
1960s and most of the 1970s. The argument against proposals to
somehow deal with drainage effluent in the valley (eg., with
evaporation ponds like Kesterson) was very straightforward.
According to the water supply agencies, salts were being imported
into the plant root zone, from both the soil and irrigation
water. These salts were accumulating at such a rate (1 million
tons a year over the whole valley), that transporting them to the
sea, "the ultimate salt sink" was the only possible solution.
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During the mid-1970s, Zach Willey, an EDF economist
specializing in water issues, began making the argument that
water conservation and other on-farm measures could certainly
reduce the projected size of the drain, and might make the drain
unnecessary (Willey, 1983).
Over the course of the 1970s, environmental groups' emphasis
on conservation grew. The debate over the possibilities for
increased conservation on California farms is touchy and
complicated. Conservation is an important issue not just with
respect to the drain, but because California is a drought-prone
state, and urban demands for water are increasing.
The conservation debate cuts deep into farmers' feelings
about their work. Because water is extremely cheap for many
farmers (costing at least nine times less than paid by the
Southern California Metropolitan Water District for SWP water), a
basic assumption of many water reform groups is that growers are
likely to waste it (Reisner, 1977).
Thus, the argument over water conservation also reflects
conflicts in core values. However, unlike the Bureau's position
over drainage effluent impacts, farmers have ultimately been more
accepting of water conservation and marketing, when they have to
be in order to remain economically viable.
1. The terms of the debate
The main area of controversy in this argument is about the
feasibility of reducing the "leaching fraction" for valley farms.
The basis of the leaching fraction is that plants take water from
the soil, they leave behind an accumulation of salts, which were
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present in the applied irrigation water. These salt deposits must
be flushed out with additional irrigation water, water not
specifically needed for plant growth. Defined as a percentage of
the gross requirement for irrigation, this additional water is
the leaching fraction. The leaching fraction varies by soil type,
the salt-tolerance of the crop, quality of applied water, and the
efficiency of irrigation systems (Davenport and Hagen, 1982).
The amount of water needed for leaching is also a function
of the total amount applied. By reducing the leaching requirement
and finding ways to minimize unnecessary application of water,
the volume of subsurface irrigation water running into tile
drains might be reduced. This would allow tile drains to be
spaced further apart, and might reduce the necessary size of the
valley drain.
The general soundness of the theory of reducing the leaching
requirement in order to increase the efficiency of irrigation has
been demonstrated in several studies (California Water Resources
Center, 1976; O'Connor and Cull, 1976). In an eight-year study of
irrigation practices in the Grand Valley in Colorado, the EPA
found that fifty-five percent of the wqater that enters the water
table from agricultural irrigation escapes from canals
surrounding fields, rather than from cultivated soil itself (EPA,
1978a). Hence, relatively inexpensive lining of canals with
plastic sheeting was found to dramatically reduce the amount of
water necessary to irrigate crops. (Unlike most areas, water in
Westlands is delivered in subsurface clay pipe, so this argument
doesn't apply). Several other innovations, such as changes in
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irrigation scheduling and restructuring water prices to reflect
water quality were shown to have a slightly less substantial
impact (EPA, 1978c, 1978d, 1978e).
By conserving water and keeping the soil continuously moist,
avoiding the wet/dry cycle that causes salts to precipitate out
of solution, drip irrigation techniques have been shown to
minimize salt damage to plants. Modification of seed placement on
the soil ridges of furrowed row crops has also been shown to help
plants resist salt damage, especially in the germination and
seedling stages, when plants are most susceptible to salinity.
Three sources cited in the IDP's 1979 report estimated that
the lowest average leaching fraction obtainable in drainage
problem areas is currently 15 percent (IDP, 1979b:7-3). DWR has
estimated that using extremely high efficiency systems, one-
hundred year projections suggest that the average leaching
fraction for San Joaquin Valley fields could be reduced to about
13 percent (Beck, 1983). These are averages for a total fields;
on some sections of a field, the leaching fraction may be as low
as 5 percent. The use of lateral-move sprinklers with computer
controls to regulate the rate of flow for each sprinkler might
exploit this feature of valley soils to reduce the leaching
requirement to about 10 percent in some areas (Beck, 1983).
2. Conservation advocated as a drain alternative
In its evaluation of alternatives to the drain, the IDP
admitted that tile drains are expensive, may require an increase
in applied water to function properly, and that the valley is
experiencing a trend toward more water conservation (IDP,
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1979b:7-3). In spite of this reality, in its final report, the
IDP devoted only one page to an explanation that "non-structural"
measures would not change the need for a drain significantly. In
support of its position, the IDP claimed that potential water
conservation programs would have to be examined on a farm-by-farm
basis, and that conservation methods usually incur start-up costs
and increase energy consumption great enough to offset their
water conservation advantages (IDP, 1979b).
On the other hand, the Director of the U.S. National
Salinity Lab has stated that "improvements in irrigation systems
are likely to result in better crop yields, reduced expenses, and
increased returns, while also conserving water and energy"
(California Water Resources Center, 1976).
Instead of asking that the USBR prove the need for a drain
per se, in the context of increasing water conservation, EDF
argued in the late 1970s and early 1980s that the Bureau is
obligated to provide more information directly relating the size
and construction schedule of the drain to the potential for water
conservation investments that might be made by farmers
considering putting in tile drains. The EDF's assumption is that
the "axiom of water development" in the valley is that because
large water projects create both demand for, and availability of,
irrigation for intensive agriculture, agricultural water (or
drainage) use will grow to meet the capacity of a given project
(Young, 1983).
As an analytical tool to estimate the demand for drainage
and hence the required size of the drain, the EDF argued that
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USBR should employ a particular mathematical model designed to
project the irrigation system options growers will choose under
different crop loss circumstances (Young, 1983). The model was
originally developed by the EPA for study of non-point source
pollution (e.g. surface irrigation runoff).
Gerald Horner, the UC Davis Agricultural Economics professor
who co-designed the model, thinks the model may show that
conservation measures will have an effect on the size and
construction schedule for the drain (Horner, 1983). The USBR
defends its decision to not use the model by stating that it was
not designed for the use EDF intends for it, that the model's
developers are not groundwater specialists, that in trying to
predict the aggregate behavior of individual farmers, the model
requires too much data, and that USBR analysis shows that
conservation will have little effect on the size of the drain in
any case (Swain, 1983).
Horner replies that his partner in developing the model is a
civil engineer, and that the Bureau is essentially uninterested
in committing itself to a rigorous analysis of the conservation
question (Horner, 1983).
In its January, 1983 San Luis Drain status report, the USBR
presented another analysis of the potential effects of water
conservation, drawing on earlier USBR and DWR work, and on the
research of David Davenport and Robert Hagan of the UC Davis
Department of Land, Air, and Water Resources (28). Here, the
Bureau claimed that water in the San Joaquin Valley is already
being used too efficiently to allow more that a 2 to 3 percent
increase in reuse, another measure of.conservation.
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The final argument for a drain built large enough to operate
below total capacity for many years is that such a drain affords
a tool for greater flexibility in managing effluent discharges to
match high Delta outflow periods (mitigating impacts in the
Delta; Beck, 1983).
3. Solar ponds; a more sophisticated alternative
During the early 1980s, EDF's case for in-valley
alternatives to the drain grew increasingly complicated and
thorough. After the discovery of selenium at Kesterson and DOT's
threat to cut off irrigation supplies, EDF was in a prime
position to market its ideas. When the Westlands Water District
began its intensive, rapid search for alternatives to the drain,
it contacted EDF. In November of 1985, the two groups negotiated
an agreement to test EDF's ideas on Westlands land, backed by a
$3.2 million federal loan, which DOI subsequently blocked release
of.
EDF's proposal is based on an ecelectic combination of
resource recovery, reuse, and water marketing plans, described in
Figure . Aside from solving the drainage disposal problem, the
appeal of EDF's proposal is that it might generate net earnings,
over the period 1990-2020, from sale of water for reuse,
recovered elements, and electricity (Willey, 1986).
The use of solar ponds, which were developed and operate
economically in Israel, is an especially novel part of the
research. In the first phase of the solar pond process, saline
drainage water is stored in a pond filled with vegetation,
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Figure 9. An Alternative Proposal
source: EDF
Salt from irrigation water builds up in farm soil along with naturally-occurring salts
and trace elements like selenium. Hence, the subsurface runoff from irrigation is
salty and polluted. EDF's plan first reduces amounts of polluted drainage water by
giving farmers economic incentives to improve irrigation efficiency, letting them
market the river water they can save. Existing desalinization technology is used to
produce valuable fresh water; the salty byproducts are then used to produce
electricity in solar ponds. Selenium and other marketable trace elements can also be
removed and possibly resold.
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simulating the effect of a marsh in removing large solids. Salts
are then removed, and the water is chlorinated to kill bacteria,
and then dechlorinated. Water from the desalting phase is
available for reuse, and the remaining brine, concentrated to 150
ppm of salt (about five times the concentration of seawater) is
used in the solar pond (see Appendix A for a more detailed
description).
A layer of brine lies about twelve to fifteen feet deep in a
solar pond, covered by a layer of brackish water, covered by a
chemical layer used to retard evaporation. Because the density of
the brine prevents a convection current from forming, solar heat
is retained in the bottom of the pond, heating the brine to about
180 degrees F. Transferred to lowboiling point liquids, this heat
is used to turn turbines which produce electricity (Smith, 1981).
4. Water marketing
Another recent proposal for solving the financial problems
of the farmers around Kesterson is to simply let their fields go
fallow, and allow them to sell their water entitlements to the
MWD. As with conservation, water marketing has broad applications
to California water policy, and is even more contentious.
To appreciate the concept of water marketing, several facets
of water supply and pricing in California are important. The
first involves the nature of the subsidies which are built into
the supply of USBR water.
Under the "rolling repayment" scheme for the Central Valley
Project, whenever a new facility or unit is added to the CVP, the
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repayment period for the entire project is extended to 50 years
from the inservice date of the most recently completed facility.
As a result, repayment for the San Luis Unit began in 1968 and,
under current proposals, would extend to 2030, an interest-free
period of 72 years. According to the USBR, the interest subsidy
for the San Luis Unit is about $1422 per acre, out of an actual
cost of $1679 per acre (in 1978 dollars). In other words, project
users pay only about 15% of project costs (USBR, 1981; Wahl,
1985).
In contrast to growers who receive inexpensive, subsidized
water from the federal CVP, cities in southern California
receiving state-supplied water pay much higher rates. For
existing contracts, water agencies in the MWD pay at least $90.05
per af., and water costs for new contractors can run as high as
$269.18 per af. Further, the MWD, which uses 1,560,000 af. per
year, will soon lose 400,000 af. of its entitlement to Colorado
River water, which will be diverted to the new Central Arizona
Project (Wahl, 1985)
The MWD projects annual deficits of 140,000 af. during
normal years by the year 2000, and deficits between 600,000 to
1,200,000 af. during periods of drought (MWD, 1983). The marginal
costs of developing new water supplies (DWR's proposed dam on
Cottonwood Creek in northern California) is at least $20 per af.
higher than existing contracts (Wahl, 1985)
Finally, according to an analysis by the NRDC, farmers in
the San Luis Service area now receive an average of $290 in net
income per acre for their crops (LeVeen and King, 1985). At the
prices paid for water by the MWD, the average value of the water
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applied to these fields is $180 per acre. Hence, from an economic
standpoint, condtitions exist which would easily allow farmers to
trade surplus water (or all of their water) to users in southern
California.
Though there are imposing legislative and institutional
barriers to overcome, EDF is pushing water marketing especially
hard as a means to pay for invalley alternatives. Like the
finance issue, water marketing and other drain alternatives
provide a common measure by which perceptions of interest and
response can be gauged. As discussed in the next chapter, in my
opinion, this represents are major area of both organizational
and, potentially crosssystem learning.
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CHAPTER 8
CONFLICT, LEARNING, AND REVISION OF BELIEFS
This section compares the results of conflict in beliefs, as
predicted by Sabatier's theoretical framework, with the
experiences recorded in the drainage case. The focus for this
analysis is on invdi.vidual organizations; DWR, USBR, EDF, NRDC,
and Westlands. At the end of the Chapter, some of the ambiguities
and circurlarities in Sabatier's framework are addressed, and
points of revision or clarification suggested.
A. The Department of Water Resources--Learning and Change as a
Result of Internal and External Pressure
An evaluation of DWR's strategic performance on issues
besides the drain would fill another entire thesis. However,
DWR's overall experience does offer a number of bases for
comparison with the Bureau of Reclamation. Like the Bureau, DWR
has historically been an engineering agency, devoted to large dam
and diversion projects. The director of DWR under the Reagan
administration (1967-1975) was a strong proponent of water
development, as were previous directors.
Like the Bureau, DWR projects serve powerful interests.
Among these are the huge and politically potent Boswell-Salyer
land companies in Kern County. Another powerful client of DWR's
is the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, which
fields an effective lobbying staff in the state legislature, as
well as highly qualified teams of engineers and planners.
Also like the Bureau, DWR has been embroiled in serious
political controversy over its projects, the Peripheral Canal.
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Especially in northern California, the Peripheral Canal has been
castigated as a means for wasteful cities and farms in southern
California and to take more water from the Delta, at the expense
of local uses.
However, unlike the Bureau, DWR has in recent years
undertaken programs which suggest some degree of organizational
learning. For example, since 1971 DWR has funded a pilot research
project on desalinization and solar ponds, located in Los Banos.
The project has faced some difficult technical questions, but has
pushed DWR 15 years along the learning curve (DWR, 1983, Smith
et. al., 1984).
Another DWR pilot project, the California Irrigation
Management System, though still in the R&D phase, has met
growing interest in the agricultural community (as suggested by
the current, pro-development Director of DWR; Munro, 1985).
In another situation involving soil salination and water
marketing, DWR has shown considerable flexibility. This is in the
Imperial Valley, in the far southern part of California, on the
border of Mexico and Arizona. The Imperial Valley is another very
hot, dry desert area, with long growing seasons and agricultural
drainage problems. In the Imperial Valley, tile drains empty into
the Salton Sea, a saline, artifical lake formed in the 1920s when
a major canal broke and poured Colorado River water into a
previously dry depression.
The Salton Sea also receives surface agricultural runoff,
like the Grasslands Water District. In close similarity to Jim
Claus' action at Kesterson, DWR's actions were prompted by the
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complaint of a local landowner. In 1980 John Elmore, a farmer who
owns land near the Salton Sea, complained to DWR that the
wasteful practices of the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) were
threatening to innundate his land.
DWR actually conducted an investigation of potential
conservation practices in the IID, and coupled its findings with
a water marketing scheme. The DWR study found that the IID could
save up to 438,000 af. of water per year through better
management. Also, "if the water... were available to the MWD, the
EIID] could reduce its purchase of SWP water by the same amount,
temporatily reducing demands on the SWP system" (Bradford, 1984).
A few months before the DWR announcement, the Environmental
Defense Fund released a 198-page study which supported the
concept of conservation and water transfers in analytical and
empirical detail. According to the EDF, conservation improvements
in the Imperial Valley would cost between $20 and $170 per af. of
water saved. Compared to its subsidized cost of water, this was
expensive from the standpoint of the IID. However, since the MWD
was paying $264 per a.f. for its water, it could quite rationally
pay the IID to implement conservation improvements in exchange
for surplus water. This exchange would also allow the IID to
circumvent the numerous legal obstacles to sale of state-supplied
water for profit (Willey, 1986).
Based on the DWR study, the SWRCB ordered the IID to
implement a tailwater monitoring program, repair and maintain
tailwater structures, develop a water accounting program, and
submit a schedule for the construction of regulatory reserviors
(Bradford, 1984). Out of their mutual self-interest, MWD and IID
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began talks about putting the conservation and water transfer
scheme into place. However, the talks have recently stalled over
the details and priorities of the conservation program.
In summary, the activities of DWR suggest that large,
engineering-centered bureaucracies can move to incorporate ideas
from other belief systems into their activities. This movement is
rarely swift and fluid, but has also been suggested in the case
of the Army Corps of Engineers (though this case was presented as
an exception to the rule; Mazmanian and Nienaber, 1980).
It is difficult to judge whether DWR would have pressed for
the drain more tenaciously if it hadn't encountered financing
problems. It is clear, however, that part of the reason DWR
hasn't been as insistent about constructing the drain as the
Bureau is because it realized the inconsistency of grower support
(Beck, 1983). DWR has maintained drainage-related activities, but
these are oriented at coordinating local efforts, like
evaporation ponds in Kern County, in support of long-term
objectives.
In my opinion, the major reason for these differences
between USBR and DWR orientation is that DWR has been forced (and
chosen) to consider the play of interests among many parties in
state water politics. This has been especially true in the case
of the Peripheral Canal controversy.
1. Forces for reform inside and outside DWR--the Peripheral
Canal Referendum
In California water policy, coalitions of convenience happen
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with some frequency. The most spectacular of these occured in
1982, when environmental groups and large, wealthy farm
corporations teamed up to defeat a public referendum on the
Peripheral Canal. The history of the Peripheral Canal is
important enough to describe briefly, because it explains in part
why DWR and USBR differ on their capacity for organizational
learning.
The Peripheral Canal is a very large earthen ditch, proposed
by DWR to carry water from the Sacramento River around the
eastern edge of the Delta, and deliver it to DWR pumps in the
southern Delta. By circumventing the network of Delta cross-
channels, the canal would allow DWR and USBR to divert larger
quantities of water to the valley and southern California. The
ballot initiative was the result of an artful legislative
compromise engineered by governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., and his
Director of DWR, Ronald Robie. The MWD fronted lobbying efforts
for the legislative version of the initiative, and helped put
together a strong centerist coalition, with wide participation by
the affected parties.
The legislative bill was essentially an attempt to
incrementally to bring protectionist ideas (like water marketing
and conservation) to the pre-Brown pro-water development regieme.
As such, its construction represented the use of "classic
rationalanalytic decisionmaking procedures to identify a water
policy package which optimized on several value dimensions"
(Munro, 1984).
However, in the public referendum, environmental and
consumer groups teamed up against the canal with their enemies,
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the wealthy and powerful Kern County (southern valley) Boswell-
Salyer combine. The environmental groups felt that the efficient
use and Delta protection provisions weren't enough, and supplied
the intellectual energy for the anticanal campaign. The Kern
County growers felt the conservation provisions were too
stringent, and supplied the money for the battle.
The high cost of the canal was used by environmental groups
as tool to educate the public about conservation and marketing,
less costly ways to increase the supply of water. The referendum
was resoundingly defeated in northern California, and not well
supported in Los Angeles either, and it went down to defeat at
the polls.
B. The Bureau Of Reclamation--Unchanging Beliefs, Unyielding
Behavior
In its tenacious struggle to build the San Luis Drain, the
Bureau has been inflexible and largely incapable of learning on
issues which do not closely correlate with its ideological
perception. It has alienated even its supporters and arguably
damaged its own selfinterest. This section suggests why this has
the Bureau has behaved this way, in reference to its beliefs.
1. A predisposition to overbuilding
Before a critique of the Bureau begins, the accomplishments
of the Central Valley Project should be put in perspective. The
CVP has undoubtedly been a major force in the economic
development of the valley, though not quite as much as original
proponents had projected. The CVP generates $1.8 billion in net
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crop revenues per year, employs 128,000 people, and contributes
$400 million per year in federal, state, and local taxes
(Milliken, 1979).
However, when the Bureau planned the CVP, there were several
indications that it would be unwise to bring water to the Panoche
Fan area (where selenium originates). These include a 1939 U.S.
Geological Survey which showed the presence of selenium in
certain San Joaquin Valley soils, at concentrations high enough
to make irrigation inadvisable. The report was ignored, but
resurfaced in 1985 (Harris, 1985b).
Studies in the 1960s raised the potential issue of
overproduction of crops. The point is not that these should have
been accepted as predictors of the future, but that the Bureau
should have looked at the consumer and producer benefits of its
programs more carefully in future analyses, and especially
consider the quality of lands being slated for irrigation. One of
these suggested some soils might contain levels of salt and boron
which would be hazardous to crops (as some soils in the Kesterson
area are, which makes farmers reluctant to recycle water; UC
Water Resources Center, 1961, 1966).
In planning the CVP, the Bureau didn't base its analysis of
the timing of water delivery, pricing levels, and project size on
sound economic principals; it simply built the largest project
Congress would authorize. Once the concrete for any project was
poured, the project had to be paid for, under terms which may not
have been completely understood when they were signed into law,
but have been difficult to reform because of the interests which
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were created (Riesner, 1977).
This strategy worked on projects built before 1967, but the
Bureau didn't alter its behavior after it had become clear to
everyone else that there were a much greater number of players in
the drainage dispute. The build-now, pay-later approach was
particularly unsound in the case of the Panoche Fan, where it was
likely that marginal lands would not be profitable to farm unless
water were highly subsidized and drainage were provided promptly.
2. An unsophisticated response to the growing number of
actors
Even in late 1984 and early 1985, when selenium problems had
awakened and alarmed public officials, university scientists, and
staff at other agencies, the Bureau was still talking about
Kesterson as a part of the drain, which would be built as soon as
studies had sorted out the problem. This was most notable in a
series of "public participation workshops" the Bureau held in
December of 1984 (USBR, 1985).
Along the same lines of political insensitivity, but in
greater magnitiude, were DOI Secretary Hodel's decision to shut
off irrigation water, and 001's delay of the fasttrack loan to
EDF and Westlands. Both of these brought DOI an enormous amount
of bad publicity.
This is not to say that USBR hasn't undergone learning in
the secondary aspects of its belief system. For example, compared
to the drain planning process of the 1960s and the 1972 EIS, the
Bureau's efforts to include public participation seem much more
advanced. These include the extensive hearings and meetings
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during the IDP program, as well as the 1984 workshops mentioned
above.
However, none of these programs reflected any kind of change
in the Bureau's core beliefs about the necessity for the drain
and the infeasibility of alternatives. In fact, they can be more
aptly seen as efforts to build the drain's public credibility.
This is most evident in the way the Bureau treated
scientific analysis, as part of the SWRCB's process of making
what everyone knew would be a political decision on the drain and
its NPDES permit. In this light, the IDP program was clearly
meant to give the SWRCB a stake in supporting a decision which it
had previously worked on. The Bureau's research program during
the NPDES permit studies also involved the participation of other
federal and state agencies. Meaningful participation by elected
officials and the general public was excluded from this process,
because of the technical level of argument. This is in contrast
to the Bureau's actions on Kesterson, when scientific analysis
began to intrude on its core beliefs, as decsribed in the
preceeding chapter.
C. The Environmental Groups--Similar Core Beliefs, Different
Tactics, Different Results
1. The Environmental Defense Fund--environmental protection
through economics, cooperative behavior
EDF's deal with Westlands, and its IID study have clearly
put it in the forefront of groups promoting 4fter marketing in
California. EDF is exploring more options for working with
growers in conservation and water marketing, and if the state
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turns to water marketing seriously, will be in a key position to
affect legislation. EDF's efforts were the subject of recent,
glowing editorials in the Fresno Bee, Los Angeles Times, and New
-York Times.
EDF's position is the result of insight by a fairly small
group of people, including Tom Graff, a lawyer who founded EDF's
Berkeley office in 1971, and Zach Willey, an economist who has
done most of the analysis.
It should be noted that EDF has benefitted from growing
concerns over water shortages and the Kesterson problem. In 1979,
when it suggested to the IDP that conservation and onfarm
measures be studied, the response was that EDF should do the
analysis themselves (Willey, 1986). EDF was similarly
unsuccessful in its attempt to get the Bureau to use Gerald
Horner's econometric model in its studies for the SWRCB.
The investment of time and resources into these studies paid
off quite well after Kesterson. EDF's current report (in draft
form) on alternative uses of drainage water is closely tailored
to growers' needs and investment horizons. EDF has been equally
sophisticated in its studies of water marketing possibilities.
With respect to farmers, EDF has followed a fairly
cooperative strategy. The philosophy of the Berkeley EDF water
group is to only use lawsuits as a last resort, and EDF has never
brought any suits over the drain. In my interview with Zach
Willey, he mentioned many of the disadvantages to lawsuits
described by the advocates of mediation in environmental disputes
(Susskind and Weinstein, 1981).
Willey's personal contacts with farmers and irrigation
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management consulting firms, stemming from his graduate research
at UC Berkeley, have been very important in uncovering areas of
common interest. For example, when a valley trade group of
irrigation supply firms began expanding their planning horizons
in 1975, they decided to bring in Willey as new member of the
Board of Directors. Through informal channels, these contacts
eventually led to the agreement with Westlands (Willey, 1986).
Economic analysis has not been the only part of EDF's
strategy. Like NRDC, EDF hired scientists to comment on the
Bureau's NPDES study plans in the early 1980s, making it one of
the few environmental groups to do so.
2. The Natural Resources Defense Council--lawsuits and
antagonistic analysis
NRDC has taken a very different approach to the drain
conflict than EDF. This is despite the fact that boths groups'
water strategies were plotted by the same people, Tom Graff and
John Leshy, in the early 1970s. However, in 1977, Leshy and most
of NRDC's San Francisco water staff were recruited to the DOI
solicitor's office by the Carter Administration. NRDC didn't get
involved in the drain dispute until 1982, when it issued comments
on the Bureau's study plans.
Since then, NRDC has been active in bringing and
coordinating several lawsuits against the Bureau, Westlands, and
the SWRCB. The primary goal of these actions is to keep up the
pressure to close Kesterson. NRDC feared, probably correctly,
that the negotiated agreement between Westlands and DOI could be
broken, because there were no counter-balancing interests to
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enforce it. Part of NRDC's strategy has been to assist local
landowners and municipalities in the legal actions, rather than
bringing suits on its own.
Because of its legal activity, NRDC gets more newspaper
quotes than any other groups, but is very unlikely to share a
relationship with growers like EDF. Aside from legal work, NRDC
also has issued a steady stream of comments on the Bureau's
Kesterson studies and cleanup plans.
Like EDF, NRDC is also heavily involved in economic analysis
of water projects. However, NRDC's main approach is critical,
rather than suggestive of immediate solutions. This is typified
by its most major report, TurnQing Off the Tap on Federal Water
Subsidies (LeVeen and King, 1985). This report quantifies the
large legal and illegal (unintended) subsidies to the CVP,
estimated at $3 billion per year. It is highly critical of the
Bureau of Reclamation, offering strong evidence that the CVP has
not helped family farmers, has contributed to crop overproduction
problem, and has possibly exacerbated the argicultural depression
in other parts of the state. The most powerful argument in
Turning Off. the Tap (which is also made by many critics of the
Bureau and DWR, most notably George Miller Jr.), is that large
percentages of the lands irrigated by the project are used to
grow nonfood, surplus crops, like cotton and alfalfa.
There is some question over how much of the policy
recommendations of in Turniqng Off the Tap will be immediately
suggested for implementation. This is because the Bureau's water
pricing policies were altered by the Reclamation Reform Act of
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1982, after a long political battle, and these reforms are now
slowly being implemented.
However, in the longer term, it is clear that the activities
of George Miller, along with Gramm-Rudman-type budgetary
pressures, will bring management of USBR projects into increasing
scrutiny. In this context, the clear, straightforward
presentation in Turning Off the Tap will help NRDC educate
journalists, politicians, and the public (Rogers, 1986)
The overall picture of the activites of EDF and NRDC is that
of two groups taking advantage of events like Kesterson and
George Miller's activism to add force to focussed, high-leverage
analysis. In my opinion, from the standpoint of the
environmental/water protection movement as a whole, the
coincidental division of labor between EDF and NRDC is a good
strategy.
Though it has chosen not to, in general, NRDC is certainly
capable of doing analysis like EDF's; the most obvious example is
NRDC's work to get the Bonneville Power Administration in the
northwestern U.S. to implement electicity conservation measures,
in lieu of building new power plants (the parallels between
conflicts in water and electricity supply and marketing are quite
strong). In fact, the primary reason NRDC is doing the legal work
in the drain case is because no other environmental groups were
willing to (Candee, 1986).
D. Farmers and the Westlands Water District--Flexibility as
Necessity
As suggested by the beliefs described in Table 5, growers
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and their representatives have supported the hegemony of the
Bureau over water policy, and have strongly resisted efforts to
bring their practices under regulatory control. However, when
necessary to protect their economic interests, growers, and
especially the Westlands Water District, have been flexible and
innovative.
Despite their strong positions in the muddled debate over
water conservation, when it became clear that Kesterson would no
longer be available as a sink for drainage effluent, Westlands
began a vigorous program of water conservation education
(Westlands, 1985). Similarly, when it became clear that solutions
to the Kesterson problem had left the Bureau's immediate control,
Westlands rapidly began searching for other solutions, such as
evaporation ponds (CH2M Hill, Inc., 1985).
Finally, after the March, 1985 negotiations with DOT,
Westlands stuck to their agreement to plug the drains, though
they could have tried to change the terms. Westlands took this
action despite the highly visible protests of farmers in the
area. These included standing in the fields around one of the
drain sites, holding hands to block digging equipment, as well as
a lawsuit (Carter, 1986a, 1986c).
E. Assessing Sabatier's Framework
As a general template or set of "file folders" with which to
sort and categorize the evolution of policy in the case of the
drain, Sabatier's framework works well. Sabatier has been
absolutely correct about the role of scientific fora in
increasing understanding of policy problems. (Though the
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university selenium conferences did reflect professional norms,
they couldn't be called entirely "depoliticized"). However, there
are nuances of conflict and policy in this case which the general
framework cannot predict, and these suggest ways in which the
framework could be improved.
1. Subsystem boundaries
The first evidence of possible revisions in the framework
derives from the difficulty of setting the boundaries of the
drainage policy subsystem. This subsystem could be described as
simply the actors who have been involved in policy-making on the
drain. However, in order to understand the roles of these actors,
it is necessary to compare them to other players in the larger
water policy subsystem. Further, it is clear that ideas from the
water policy subsystem have been forced into the drainage debate,
and vice versa.
By considering the relevant policy subsystem as all the
actors involved in California water policy, the possibilities of
recognizing multiple-issue solutions are increased (and the
researcher has to do much more work). The multiple-issue
perspective is important, because it suggests conditions under
which some aspects of core belief systems (which have several
parts) may be overridden--without the extreme resistance
predicted by Sabatier (and shown by the Bureau).
The theoretical origins of this argument come from the
literature on negotiation and conflict resolution. As suggested
by Raiffa (1982), multiple-party, multiple-issue disputes offer
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the participants the opportunity for solutions which would
improve their positions, relative to bargains which would be
struck issue-by-issue. The key to this style of "integrative
bargaining," or creation of "joint gains," is trading across
issues of differing value among several participants. In sections
below, I will suggest that this in fact happens in California
water policy.
There is strong evidence that several of the players in the
drain case think from a multiple-issue orientation. For example,
the Westlands Water District currently faces several important
conflicts over its use of federally-subsidized water. These
include in-progress negotiations with the Bureau over its water
contracts, and a long-standing lawsuit over the legality of
Westlands' annexation of 150,000 acres in the former Westplains
Water District. Westlands also has a major stake in the
enforcement of the "hammer clause" in the 1982 Reclamation Reform
Act, which will set standards and increase the price of water for
growers with large acreages.
2. Interests, beliefs, and "integrative" compromise
The history of California water policy has been full of
coalitions of convenience, and may be entering into an era of
integrative bargaining and compromise (as suggested by the
energence of "win-win" issues like water marketing). An example
of legislation which integrated the priorities of many parties
was the Peripheral Canal bill, SB 200 (which was altered then
defeated by a coalition of convenience). EDF and Westlands'
agreement was clearly the result of common interest. The SWRCB's
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3-year deadline to close and clean up Kesterson has elements of
compromise as well.
The most prominent example of integrative compromise in the
case of the drain is a federal bill proposed by George Miller in
late May, 1986. The bill is clearly an attempt to reach across
several issues for a solution to the drainage problem. Its major
features include:
--a $100 million fund to establish a new drainage system in
valley;
--a new California Water Exchange, to market surplus water,
with proceeds going to federal purchase of selenium-
contaminated land and restoration of wildlife refuges;
--$30 million for research into drainage problems;
--legal recognition of Westlands' expansion into Westplains;
--government purchase of farmland, in cases where farms
produced contaminated wastewater, or were forced out of
production by selenium contamination and lack of drainage;
--penalties for the use of government subsidized water to
grow surplus crops, like cotton;
--prohibition of further construction of the San Luis Drain;
--forgiving Westlands from having to repay a $42 million
federal loan (Johnson, 1986).
Simply looking at the beliefs outlined in Tables 3-5 and
considering the wide play of internal and external forces on the
drainage/water policy subsystem would not predict this type of
legislation (regardless of its changes for success, which are
significant). This suggests one of the shortcomings of the
general and belief-centered Sabatier framework. Though the
framework recognizes all the important factors in policy
evolution, and suggests a hierarchy for competition among
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beliefs, it doesn't offer any means of sorting out the relative
impact of beliefs and learning relative to integrative
compromise, and a very large variety of "external events."
Sabatier might reply that this is an example of learning
across systems, which is true. However, it may be an example of
learning as a result of a clash between core beliefs, leavened by
the crisis at Kesterson and recognition that stalemate is in no
one's interest. It is probably not a core/secondary conflict,
where Sabatier says more learning will occur (Hypotheses 3, 4,
and 5 from Chapter 6).
Furthermore, one of the lessons of the drain case is that
belief systems have several components. This would allow for
compromises across core beliefs, like those contained in Miller's
bill, a complication not entirely predicted by Hypothesis 6.
3. Beliefs versus self-interest--the importance of
distinction
To me, the section above suggests that the major
contribution of the Sabatier framework will be in its explication
of the role of beliefs in influencing policy change in cases
where beliefs are an overriding factor. This has been most
clearly been true for the Bureau of Reclamation.
Compared to another politically conservative player, the
Westlands WD, USBR has been incredibly inflexible in seeking
alternatives to the drain. This may be related to the origins of
beliefs for private versus public actors. That is, the purpose of
the Westlands Water District is to reflect the economic and water
interests of its members. Within certain constraints, Westlands
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exercizes all kinds of tactical flexibility in propoting its
interests. Ideology is important, but not overriding. Compared to
a fully public agency like the Bureau, it is easy to portray the
virtues of private enterprise, especially farming. There is no
need for an elaborate belief structure of self-justification.
This is not the case with the Bureau of Reclamation. The
reasons for this difference are described by Downs (1967).
Bureaus are empowered with providing resources where the market
cannot, and are dependent on public and congressional support for
their existence. Bureau officials are aware that they must
compete for funding, and that few politicians or members of the
public can be expected to master the technical details of their
performance and purpose. (For the Bureau of Reclamation, this has
recently changed). In response to this situation, bureau
officials develop qualitative descriptions of the importance of
their mission; these become the bureau's "ideology." According to
Downs, bureaucratic ideologies can have a life of their own,
ending up as substitutes for other kinds of policy analysis.
This distinction between ideology and economic self-interest
may serve as an important guide to the feasibility of
"integrative compromises" like that described above. However, it
is pereived interest which is important--this may account for
the different postures of the Bureau and DWR.
DWR serves as an more valid comparison to the Bureau than
Westlands. However, unlike USBR, DWR has learned that dam-and-
diversion agencies devoted to engineering can retain resources
and influence within a greater breadth of agency purpose. This is
most likely the result of internal and external pressures on DWR
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during the 1970s. Though the Carter administration put tried to
prevent the Bureau from building "porkbarrel" water projects, DWR
faced greater forces for change--its director during the Brown
administration was an environmental lawyer.
4. Focusing on beliefs as a circular argument
To use Sabatier's framework, one must be able to make
statements about beliefs. The best way to understand actors'
beliefs is to look at how they behave first, then observe the
statements they make to justify their actions. In light of the
fact that agencies don't often make statements about core beliefs
in the general course of setting policy, there are not many other
alternatives. This orientation is different from a content
analysis approach, which may over-emphasize stated beliefs
(intentions), compared to actual behavior.
However, any means of defining beliefs explicitly encounters
a problem of circular argument. Sabatier's Hypotheses 1 and 2 are
also definitions of the core/secondary distinction. Beliefs which
actors are willing to fight over are defined as the core. Thus,
any major battle in the course of evolution of policy becomes a
clash between core beliefs. Sabatier suggests in Hypotheses 3, 4,
and 5 that a clash between core beliefs will generate "more heat
than light," and not result in as much policy learning as would
otherwise be possible.
There are other factors which can mediate the effect of a
clash between beliefs. Sometimes the confluence of "problems,
policy and politics" (as thoughtfully considered by Kingdon,
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1984) can make it obvious to an advocacy coalition that a defense
of certain core beliefs will be fruitless. In this case, energy
which would have been spent in an entrenched political and
analytical battle is diverted to finding solutions which are in
harmony with other core beliefs.
This is my interpretation of the discovery of Selenium at
Kesterson. Despite periods of intense controversy over the
Peripheral Canal, my perception is that most farmers in the
valley understand that the era of new projects and ultra-
subsidized water is over. Thus, they are looking for other ways
to continue farming profitably, exploring terrain that was left
uncovered in earlier years.
(I also believe that Kesterson should not be treated as the
kind of suprise which is not likely to happen in other kinds of
policy disputes. On the contrary, most policies which involve
advanced technology and natural resuorces will have this
character. In valley agriculture, there have been a long series
of highly visible problems with pests and pesticides. These
include the Medfly outbreak and spraying of the early 1980s;
illnesses caused by pesticide-contaminated watermelons in 1985;
'T Fe ves e
an outbreak of the Japanses beetle and spraying in Sacramento
neighborhoods the year before; and the discovery of nitrate-
contaminated wells in Kern County. Problems in toxic waste,
nuclear power, space programs and perhaps industrial plant
closings may have the same "suprising" character. In fact, we may
come to see the ability to plan for suprise as one measure of
organizational learning itself).
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Appendix A: Components of Desalinization Process
source: Brian Smith, DWR
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CHEMICAL LAB.
The building In front of your houses the chemical laboratory. The laboratory Is set up to
analyze all of the parameters that are critical to the operation of the Demonstration Desalting
Facility.
The purpose of having a chemical laboratory on-site is to avoid lengthy turn around times
when samples must be sent elsewhere for analysis. Most constituents that are monitored on
the site can be analyzed in less than 12 hours, allowing personnel to make Immediate
decisions on how well the plant is operating.
The laboratory Is equipped with several sophisticated instruments, such as a Total Organic
Analyzer, an Atomic Adsorption Spectrophotometer and Ultra-Violet Spectrophotometer.
Also housed In the laboratory are two microscopes (a compound and a dissecting) for
evaluation of the biological pretreatment system.
Not Open to tour
MARSH PONDS
Thirty marshponds along Highway 152 make up the biological pretreatment system. Each
430 foot long by 35 foot wide pond Is planted with alkali bulrush, a native aquatic plant.
The drain water is pumped into the south end of each pond and flows by gravity to individual
weir boxes at the north end. The alkali bulrush acts as a natural filtration network, reducing
suspended solids and shading the water to Inhibit green algae growth. At the same time, the
plants provide a place for diatoms, a different type of algae, to grow. The diatoms are unique
in that they take up silica, a troublesome mineral that can damage the reverse-osmosis units.
By adjusting flow rates and depths, an optimum operating mode will be determined for
maximum removal rates of suspended solids and silica.
After leaving the marshponds. the water is routed to the gravity filters for further treatment.
CLA RIFlER
SOLIDS REACTOR-CLARIFIER
The large, cylindrical structure in front of you is the solids reactor-clarifier. Drain water is
pumped Into the clarifier through an inlet on the side, while at the same time special
chemicals such as alum and lime are added from the top. These chemicals are mixed and
pumped from the chemical feed shed to your left.
The drain water/chemical mixture is slowly mixed by an agitator resembling a giant
eggbeater. The agitation results in the chemicals causing clumping of the suspended solids
that are in the drain water. The heavier combined particles then sink to the bottom of the
clarifier while the lighter combined particles float to the top. These fine particles and the
treated water are then carried to the gravity filter where the remaining particles are removed.
Upon leaving the clarifier, sulfuric acid is added to the water to reduce the alkalinity to a
neutral level (pH 7).
SOLIDS REACTOR CLARIFIER
Scale % = 1'-0"
CHLORINATION
This small building holds the chlorination system. This system is very important to the overall
operation in that chlorine gas is used as a disinfectant, killing algae and bacteria that are
harmful to the desalting units.
From here, chlorine gas is combined with water, creating a mixture that is piped to various
chlorination points in the facility. The first place this mixture is used is at the solids reactor-
clarifier. The chlorine mixture is also added prior to marshpond water entering Gravity Filters
3 and 4.
Additionally, the chlorine-water mixture is added prior to Clearwells 1. 2. 3, 4. 5 and 6. This
assures that, just prior to entering each RO unit, the feedwater will be free of algae and
bacteria which may cause clogging of the desalting units.
/7-Chlorine Gas
Solids Reactor - Clarifier
High Pressure Reverse - Osmosis
Unit (RO-35)
Normal Pressure Reverse - Osmosis
Unit (RO-2)
Low Pressure Reverse - Osmosis
Unit (RO-1) K
AhorneChl riAnalyzed
Continually
All Manual Control
Except 1
[
E
Control Panel
Chlorine Leak Alarm
Marsh Pond Feedwater
Entering Filters
Marsh Pond
> Filter Water Entering
Clearwell # 1 and Clearwell # 2
CHLORINATION SYSTEM
GRAVITY
GRAVITY FILTER
The large, rectangular structure in front of you contains four gravity filters. Numbered from
left to right, the first two filters (1 and 2) receive water from the marshponds. Filters 3 and 4
receive water from the solids reactor-clarifier. Filters 1 and 3 differ slightly from 2 and 4 byhaving different filtering media. Filters 2 and 4 have anthracite media with gravel while Filters1 and 3 have a combination of sand and anthracite coal media with gravel. This will allow usto determine the best media for our particular needs.
The water enters the filters from the top, percolates down through the filter media and then
through a surge tank and finally is stored in two tanks called clearwells. The filters must bebackwashed periodically to clean the filter media. This is done by pumping some filtered
water up through the filters, stirring the bed and releasing the solids that clog the filter. Thebackwash and clearwell system are located behind the filters.
FILTER
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REVERSE-OSMOSIS UNITS
The large building you are about to enter contains the three reverse-osmosis (RO) desalting
units. The units will work in series, each one operating at a different pressure and flow rate.
RO Unit 1 contains newly developed low pressure membrane units. Its product water
capacity is 230.000 gallon#s per day and it operates at 250 pounds per square inch (psi).
RO Unit 2 contains conventional reverse-osmosis membranes and operates at 400 psi. The
feedwater for Unit 2 is the leftover brine from Unit 1. Unit 2 will produce 76,000 gallons per
day of fresh water.
RO Unit 3 contains seawater reverse-osmosis membranes and operates at 800 psi. As before.
the feedwater for Unit 3 is the leftover brine from Unit 2. Unit 3 will produce 38.000 gallons
per day of fresh water. The leftover brine is that used to regenerate the ion-exchange system.
Adding the product water capacities of the three units gives 344,000 gallons per day of fresh
water. This is 90 percent of the 382,000 gallons per day which is introduced into RO Unit 1 at
the head of the system. The use of stages operating at different pressures allows this system
to use much less energy than conventionally designed reverse-osmosis systems.
At various points in the system, the feedwater to each unit is treated with various chemicals.
including chlorine and acid and precipitation inhibitors.
These units have automated data collection systems, allowing the plant's data acquisition
system to record the performance of the systems continuously.
DESIGN SCHEMATIC
230,000 gpd 76,000 gpd 38,000 gpd
560 ppm 500 ppm 500
I I I
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ppm - parts per million
(Sea Water Is 35,000 ppm
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Total Product 344,000
- 100%
Total Feed 382,000
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Design Conds.
ION EXCHANGE SYST EM
The two units in front of you comprise the ion-exchange system. The system is actually two
independent units, each capable of treating 200.000 gallons of water per day.
Each unit is basically a very large water softener. The drain water is very high in hardness,
meaning there are lots of calcium and magnesium ions. If this water were passed through the
RO membranes, calcium sulfate would percipitate and foul the membranes. This hardness
problem is eliminated by the ion-exchange system. The drain water is pumped through the
large blue tanks containing a bed of resin beads that have sodium and potassium ions
attached to them. This resin has a higher affinity for the calcium and magnesium, so an
exchange takes place, leaving sodium and potassium ions in place of the calciumand
magnesium Ions. The sodium and potassium ions pose no problems for the RO membranes.
The ion exchange units can be operated manually or by computer. Each unit has several flow
and electrical conductivity meters connected at various stages of the process for ease in
detecting possible problems.
The water to be "exchanged" or softened will come from Clearwells 1 and 2 (filtered solids
reactor-clarifier and filtered marshpond water, respectively). The water leaving Clearwells 1
and 2 is dechlorinated to prevent damage to the resin. After softening, the water is stored in
Clearwells 3 and 4 where it is chlorinated.
Eventually, the units must be regenerated to replace the previously absorbed calcium and
magnesium with sodium and potassium. This will be done with the brine resulting from the
desalting process which contains the sodium and potassium previously exchanged. This is a
unique method of regeneration which allows the desalting plant to turn 90 percent of the
feedwater into fresh water.
Regeneration Cycle
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Service Cycle
SOLAR PONDS
SALT-GRADIENT SOLAR POND SYSTEM
In the distance is the salt gradient solar pond system, still under construction. It consists of
two half-acre solar ponds, two half-acre evaporation ponds, an operations building and office
trailer and associated pumps, piping, and tanks.
This system will take the reject brine from the desalting process, concentrate it to a salinity
of about six times that of seawater, and use It to convert solar energy into electrical power.
Salt-gradient solar ponds have a very salty (and therefore dense) bottom layer, covered by
another layer of water that decreases in salinity from bottom to top. This gradient layer
allows sunlight to penetrate to the bottom of the pond and heat the lower layer. Because
each level in the gradient layer is heavier than the water above it, the layer can have no
convection currents and thus insulates the bottom layer, trapping the solar energy stored
there.
The hot brine in the bottom layer -- about 185 degrees Fahrenheit - will be used to vaporize
a fluid with a low boiling point, which will then spin a turbine connected to a generator.
In a full-scale desalting plant, solar ponds such as these would provide energy to operate the
desalter and at the same time usefully dispose of the briny byproduct of the desalting
process.
While most solar pqnds in this country have been built for research purposes, the technology
has advanced in Israel to the point where commercially usable quantities of electrical power
are being produced at ponds near the Dead Sea.
The Los Banos pond system will demonstrate, among other things, the feasibility of using the
salts found in the reject desalting brine in this innovative solar energy application.
Not Open to tour
